Manpower and Unit Quality

All the historians consulted for this project referred to the strengths of the armies as though nothing happened between the opening of hostilities on August 15th and the start of the respective battles. Yet there were many long marches in the rain and numerous combats and skirmishes leading up to them. As a result most sources that we have used—and cited in the Study folder—tend to overstate the strength of forces on the battlefields.

In order to determine the manpower of each unit we created a model for estimating each unit’s losses in attrition and combat, plus replacements.

We calculated attrition based on the known marches during the weeks before the battles, then converted the raw manpower of a unit into strength points on a sliding scale tied to the Initiative Rating printed on the unit, from 350 to 800 men per point. The “good” infantry were around 500. Anything 600 or above would be poor quality. The French Imperial Guard (Old & Middle) were given an Initiative Rating of 4 and their strength calculated at 350 men per point. “Grenadiers” and “Elites” received a 4 for Initiative and 400 men/SP. “First rate” units received an Initiative of 3 and 500 men/SP. “Veteran” rated 2 and 600 men/SP.1 “Conscripts” received an Initiative of 1 and 700 men/SP. “Landwehr and Trained Militia” rated Initiative 1 and 800 men/SP.

Cavalry rated between 400 and 500 men per SP; Cossacks, 600 men per SP. The veteran French cavalry mostly served in the III, IV, and V Reserve Cavalry Corps (400 men/SP), while the I and II Reserve Cavalry Corps were mostly formed of newly raised squadrons (500 men/SP) (see Table 3). Artillery is rated 1 SP per battery (12 guns).

EXAMPLE: Von Bosch’s Saxon infantry brigade in the 25th Division of VII Corps, with an initiative of 2, was rated at 600 men per SP. Its full strength is 5 SPs.

The Brigade had 57 officers and 2840 men on 15 August. We calculated attrition at 193 men, leaving 2704 in the ranks at the Battle of Grossbeeren (a strength of 5 SPs). We estimated a total of 407 battle casualties at Grossbeeren and a further 568 who may have fallen out of the ranks during the retreat, leaving 1922 still with the colors at the time of Dennewitz.

For Blücher’s Army of Silesia we figured a total loss to attrition and battle of 27,000 men, leaving Blücher with 63,000 men at Katzbach (excluding Pahlen and St. Priest’s Corps, who were not on the battlefield).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Total Loss at Katzbach</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACKEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
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</table>

Petre, in Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany, credits Yorck and Sacken with 55,000 and Langeron with 31,000 men, which was about their strength on August 15th.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2. BLÜCHER’S MARCHES AUGUST 1813</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SACKEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>13PM Hunsfeldbei Breslau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15PM Lissa</td>
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<tr>
<td>16PM Ober-Moys and Eisendorf</td>
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<tr>
<td>17PM Kloster- Wahlstadt</td>
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<tr>
<td>18PM Liegnitz</td>
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<tr>
<td>19PM Lowenberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>20PM Modelsdorf</td>
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<tr>
<td>22PM Ober-Au</td>
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<tr>
<td>23PM Liegnitz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>26PM Malitsch</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 3. Infantry Ratings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Scott Bowden, Napoleon’s Grande Armée of 1813, 1990. We followed the Morale Classification Chart on page 343.
19.0 SCENARIOS

Four Lost Battles includes Four Battle Scenarios, as well as a Campaign Game. Players select which scenario they intend to play, and then refer to the Scenario Information (see 21.0 et seq.).

19.1 The Four Battles

Scenarios One through Four are “Battle Games” and must start on the Game-Turn specified. The Campaign Game starts on 23 August, with the start of the Grossbeeren Battle Game.

19.11 Universal Turn Record Track: The Game-Turn Record Track applies to all four games interchangeably—it bears no date, just the 24-hour nomenclature for each Game-Turn—and will be used in each battle game. The Scenario Information will specify the exact turn on which each game begins and ends. The Game-Turn marker is placed on the Turn Record Track in the turn listed in the Scenario Information as the Game Start. Each scenario includes the turns listed under duration as starting and ending turns. If a battle game continues on the second day, just start the marker over at the top of the Track. Reinforcements are specified in the Scenario Information as modified by the play of Arrival Cards (see 19.4).

19.12 The Campaign Game: All four battle games are played in chronological order (see 25.0). Depending upon the level of victory in the battles of Grossbeeren, Katzbach, and Kulm, one or both players may draw “Bonus Cards” on the second turn of Kulm and Dennewitz. (See 18.32 and the Campaign Scenario Information, 25.15.)

19.2 Setting Up the Scenarios

Each map has a Force Key which shows every major Formation in the game. Sort and store the counters by Formation, and start setting up the game by selecting the Formations shown. All units start on the map as Hidden Forces. Units already reorganized (listed under “Reduced Strength Units”) must set-up on their reduced-strength side.

19.21 Initial Set Up: The Coalition Player refers to the Initial Set Up for the Coalition Army and sets up first; the French Player employs the Initial Set Up for the French Army. The Initial Set Up specifies the set-up location for each unit or formation. After setting up, the Initial Set Up may be modified by Mode cards (see 18.5). Make sure you check for reduced strength units, listed at the end of the Initial Set-up.

19.22 Hex Numbers: The hex numbers show where units were historically located at the start of that day. Place all the combat units and leaders directly on the map in the hex specified in the Initial Set Up. Should the set up include any overstacked hexes, displace the excess units at the owning player’s choice.

19.23 Reinforcements: See separate paragraphs for units and leaders listed as “French Reinforcements” and “Coalition Reinforcements.” Reinforcements arrival is listed in the Scenario Information and may be affected by the Arrival Cards (see 19.4).

19.24 Bridge and Baggage Trains: Each player receives one pontoon train in each battle, and may set it up freely (as a pontoon or as a train). Pontoon Trains must be set-up within [7] hexes of any friendly Commander. Pontoon Trains may be deployed over rivers at the start of any scenario. The various Baggage Trains set up within [7] hexes of any unit in their respective Corps (if on map) or enter as reinforcements behind all the other units of their corps, unless otherwise specified. Each corps has its own baggage train. EXCEPTION: (see 14.41).

19.25 Leaders: Commanders set-up in the hex specified or at owning player’s choice with any Friendly force, if no hex is specified. Officers set-up in any hex containing units of their Formations. Leaders ignore Mode Cards. EXCEPTION: Card 2, Late Start.

19.26 Vedettes: Vedettes may be deployed at the beginning of a scenario, at the owning player’s option, anywhere within five hexes of their parent unit (not in EZOCs); the cavalry parent unit for such vedettes is placed in the full-strength Units Holding box. The first player deploys all his Vedettes first, then the second player deploys his.

19.27 Cards At Start: (see 18.31)

19.3 Scenario Information

The following information is detailed in sections 21.0—25.0.

19.31 Introduction: In this section is listed: Duration (the starting and ending turns of the scenario are listed inclusive); Mode Cards At Start (specifies the number of cards each player will draw on the first turn only). Card Deck (remove specified cards from decks—see 18.2). The French Player is the First Player in all scenarios.

19.32 Initial Set-up: Specifies a location for each unit on the map at the start of the scenario, followed by a listing of all Reinforcements. Units are listed by Corps/Division or Corps/Brigade. If a division is listed, then all units of that division appear unless otherwise specified. The quantity of units in a given group is listed in parenthesis. Quantity does not include vedettes, leaders or baggage (see 19.5). EXAMPLE: XIV/Illowaiski = Illowaiski’s Bde. of Rus. XIV Corps. ABBREVIATIONS: Res. = Reserve; Bde. =
Brigade; Div. = Division; Gd. = Guard; Art. = Artillery; HA. = Horse Artillery; S/S = Supply Source; GB = Grossbeeren; KZ = Katzbach; KU = Kulm; DN = Dennewitz.

19.33 Special Rules: Rules which apply only to this battle (if any).

19.34 Victory Conditions: Victory Point awards for control of places.

19.35 Reduced Strength Units: Some units may have been eliminated or reduced at prior battles. In all the battle games, units listed under “Reduced Strength Units,” set-up at their reduced strengths. In the Campaign Game, units in the UAR (not PEU) at Grossbeeren should be kept together in order to set-up at their reduced strength for Dennewitz.

19.4 Reinforcements
Most battles have Regular (1st Day) and 2nd Day Reinforcements. All Reinforcement entries are shown following the Initial Set-up. Reinforcements enter at the hex specified on the mapedge. If a Corps or Formation is listed, all units which are not mentioned separately enter on the same turn.

19.41 Reinforcement Availability: Alternate Reinforcements are listed after the Historical Reinforcements. Each side has a numbered list of Alternate Reinforcements. One numbered group of Alternate Reinforcements appears for each Alternate Reinforcements card played. These groups must appear in order of priority in the list. In the campaign game any Alternate Reinforcements that enter into the Katzbach or Kulm battles are unavailable for Dennewitz.

19.42 Hidden Reinforcements: All Reinforcements enter the map Hidden. Vedettes may enter instead of their parent Light Cavalry units.

19.43 Deploying Off-map Reinforcements: Prior to entry all units in the force are deployed off map in a road march column, beginning with the leader at the front of the road march column, and ending with the baggage. The Reinforcements can enter in road march or not. This rule establishes their order of arrival.

19.5 March Order
One March Order per player may be issued prior to the start of any scenario, to any friendly force in play on the map, if a friendly Commander is on-map at the start of the scenario (see 7.42). EXCEPTION: 23.34.

20.0 VICTORY CONDITIONS

Victory Conditions apply to all scenarios alike. Victory is awarded to the player with the most points at the end of the game; or, in the Campaign Game according to the ratio of each player’s Victory Point total at the end of play (see 25.4).

20.1 Victory Point Awards
Victory Points are awarded at the end of the game, depending upon the strength of combat units eliminated, enemy corps demoralized, control of certain terrain features, for exiting the map, etc.

20.11 Determine VP Totals: Determine VPs for…

a) Enemy Combat SPs Eliminated (see 20.12)
b) Enemy Corps Demoralized (see 20.13).
c) Captured Enemy Baggage Trains (see 20.14).
d) controlled hexes (see 20.15)
e) Total the VP Values of each card you have played.
f) Units that have exited (see 20.4)

20.12 Total Combat SPs Eliminated
Determine the number of total Coalition and French Combat Strength in the PEU, plus the Unrecovered and Recovered boxes at the end of play, total the losses in SPs by both sides, and subtract the smaller from the larger total. Award VPs to the side losing the fewest SPs at a ratio of 1:5; differential of 0-4, 0 VPs; 5-9, 1 VP; 10-14, 2 VPs; 15-19, 3 VPs; etc... “Total Combat Strength Eliminated” includes units permanently eliminated and those still awaiting reorganization. (Eliminated Vedettes do not grant VPs.) Do not count units in the Full Strength Holding Box.


20.15 Control: Each Player receives [4] VPs for each Enemy Supply Source he controls at the end of the scenario. (If the Enemy controls a Supply Source, place a Control Marker in the hex.) The Scenario Victory Conditions specify additional hexes and the value in VPs for the control of each. To be considered in control of one of these hexes, a friendly Combat Unit must physically occupy the hex, or be the last Combat Unit to have occupied or moved through it. If the occupying unit is Out of Supply at the moment it enters or moves through the hex, the hex is not controlled by that unit.
20.16: Cards: As specified on the card, add or subtract the VP Value of each card you have played during the game.

20.2 Levels of Victory
At the end of the battle divide the French by the Coalition VP total (French: Coalition). The total of Victory Points achieved by the two players is expressed as a ratio, which determines the level of victory.

20.11 Find ratio:
1:2+, the Coalition Player wins a Strategic Victory
1:1.5 to 1.99, Coalition Tactical Victory
1:1 to 1.49, Coalition Marginal Victory
1:1 to 1.5:1, French Marginal Victory
1.51:1 to 2:1, French Tactical Victory
2.1:1+, French Strategic Victory

20.12 Total of VPs Less than One: Convert scores less than “1” to “1” for purposes of calculating ratio.

20.13 Levels of Victory in the Campaign Game:
In the Campaign Game the Victor and Level of Victory achieved in each individual battle must be recorded (see 25.4). A given level of Victory will allow the Victor to draw “Bonus Cards” from the Card Decks in the upcoming games in the campaign (see 19.12).

20.3 Capture of Commanders
A player receives a number of VPs for each Captured Commander equal to that Commander’s Command Rating. EXCEPTION: The game immediately ends in a Coalition Victory the moment Napoleon is captured.

20.4 Exiting the Map
Either Player may choose to exit his units by playing the “General Retreat” card. Friendly units may exit the map at a Friendly Supply Source hex or other hex specified in the Scenario Instructions (see 23.33). The exiting unit pays the Movement Point cost of the hex it is leaving, again. Exited leaders may not reorganize units. Units forced to retreat off the map are eliminated (see 11.44). Units which voluntarily exit the map cannot be returned to play, but are not considered eliminated for victory point purposes.

20.41 VP Award: If he plays the “General Retreat” card the Exiting Player receives [4 VP] for exiting his baggage train, and [1 VP] for every five combat units exited (do not count vedettes). EXCEPTION: You may not receive more VPs for Exiting the Map than you receive for Enemy Combat units eliminated.

20.42 No Award: Even if you do not hold the “General Retreat” card, you may wish to exit your units to prevent their destruction, either at the Friendly Supply Source or exit hexes specified in the Scenario, but you receive no VPs.

20.5 Minimum Loss
The Player receives [2] VPs if the total of eliminated SPs in the Friendly PEU and UAR boxes at the end of the game is zero.

20.6 Game Ending
The game ends with the completion of the last turn specified under “Duration,” below; or may end in an Automatic Victory, which is declared immediately, upon either event: a) Napoleon is in play and is captured (see 20.3); or, b) all the corps of one side are demoralized. The level of the Automatic Victory has to be determined (see 20.2), and if less than marginal a “draw” is declared. A “draw” means neither side wins.

21.0 THE BATTLE OF GROSSBEEREN
To the Gates of Berlin, 23 August

21.1 Introduction
The battle of Grossbeeren was a meeting engagement in which the two forces were ignorant of their mutual presence in the area. Grossbeeren is a double battle, with little possibility of interaction between troops that fought in Blankenfeld because of swamps. Oudinot took a risk in separating his three corps on parallel routes as was customary when marching through open country. The IV Corps on the right, held-up as they emerged from the woods, were unable to assist VII Corps at Grossbeeren in the center; while Oudinot, on the left, tended to his own corps, considerably strung out after a long Forced March on the 22nd—instead of coordinating the battle.

21.11 Duration: 09.00 - 20.00 hrs., 23 August
21.12 Mode Cards at Start: 2 French, 3 Coalition
21.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:
2x Delay—March Confusion, 1x “Replacements.”
21.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove:
1x “Sick and Tired,” 1x “Replacements,” 2x “Lost,” 1x “Early Start.”
21.15 Bonus Cards (Battle Game and Campaign):
Coalition: 3; French: 3.

21.2 Initial Setup

21.21 French Setup:
IV Corps—BERTRAND, 15th div. (4 units), 2nd Art., 4th HA (2605) and/or in adjacent hexes.

21.22 Coalition Setup:
IV Corps—Kurmark (1504), HA (1604), Lindenau (1605), Dobs. Ldw (1803), Strampf (1805); TAUEN-ZIEN and baggage anywhere (Tauenzien is out of Supply). Wobes. Ldw and Hirsch. Ldw do not set up on the map. These 2 units are Alternate Reinforcements (see 21.25).

III Corps—BULOW, 3rd and 4th bdes. and Holtzendorf (0113) and/or adjacent hexes; 6th Bde (1117).

21.23 Reinforcements
Baggage Trains are not always specified (see 19.24 and 14.41).

FRENCH:
09.00—REYNIER, VII Corps from (2616)

EXCEPTION: the 32nd div., Saxon 5th Art and 1st-2nd HA from (2621); Bde Devaux is Alt. Reinf. only (see 21.25).

09.00—IV/12 (4 units) from 2604.

EXCEPTION: The 38th Div. and 24th LC (6 Württemberg units) are Alt. Reinf. only (see 21.25).

13.00—XII Corps, OUDINOT from (2626).

EXCEPTION: The 29th Div. (3 Bavarian units) are Alt. Reinf. only (see 21.25).

18.00—ARRIGHI, IIIC/6LC, IIIC/4HC and 1st-5th HA from (2626)

COALITION:

12.00—III/5th Bde, III/(-) Cav from (0123)

14.00—III/Oppen, III/HA from (0123)

16.00—XIV/Illowaiski, Lowenstern from (0123)

17.00—Sw/2nd X, 4th X from (0123)

21.24 Second Day Reinforcements
If the Second Day of Battle card is played, continue the battle until 20.00 hrs turn of August 24th. In this case the following reinforcement units arrive, late on the 23rd.

FRENCH:
23rd 20.00 - IIIC/5th LC Div (2 units) from (2626)

COALITION:

23rd 21.00 - Russian XIV Corps from (0123)

23rd 24.00 - Swedish Corps from (0123)

21.25 Alternate Reinforcements:

FRENCH:
1. XII/29th Div. (3 Bavarian units) from (2626)
2. IV/38th Div. & IV/24th LC Bde. (8 Württemberg units) from (2604)
3. IIIC/5th LC Div (2 units) from (2626)
4. VII/Devaux Bde from (2616)

COALITION:
1. IV/Hirsch Ldw from 0833
2. Russian XIV Corps from 0123
3. Swedish Corps from 0123
4. IV/Wobes Lde from 1501

Accelerate the arrival of the Russians and Swedes (21.24) to arrive on the turn determined by die roll.

COALITION: (1) Bernadotte, (2) Winzingerode.

21.27 Reduced Strength Units

(none)

21.3 Special Rules

21.31 Coalition Supply: The Army of the North was out of supply until after the battle, so it was very heavy to maneuver. The Swedish and Russian baggage trains may not enter play in this scenario. Swedish and Russian units that enter the game may only trace to Coalition mapedge Supply Sources, and may not share the Prussian baggage.

21.32 Bülow Semi-Active (new Special Rule)
Bülow's at start force begins in Semi-Active status, and remains so until released (see Card 19 for effects). Roll at the start of each Friendly Player Turn to try and release him. He is released on a die-roll of 1. MODIFIER: At 10.00 hrs, subtract 1 from the die, at 11.00, subtract 2, at 12.00, -3, etc. For each group of French Alternate Reinforcements that have arrived, subtract 1. Bülow is also released if the enemy are within his personal Line of Sight.

21.33 Historical Note: On hearing the cannon at Blankenfelde at 10.00, on his own initiative Bülow marched for Lichtenrade to support Tauenzien. On Bernadotte's orders, he turned around and reoccupied his old camp at Heinersdorf at 13.00 in the pouring rain, marching 12 km from Heinersdorf to Lichtenrade and back.

21.4 Victory Conditions

21.41 Control: The controlling player receives, at the end of each Game-Turn:
1. 1 VP for control of Blankenfeld (hex 1704)
2. 1 VP for control of Grossbeeren (hex 1117)
(Keep a running total VP award per player.) The player who controls Blankenfeld and/or Grossbeeren at the end of the game receives 5 Victory Points for each of the 2 towns.

21.42 Campaign Game: If Grossbeeren had been a French Strategic victory—leading to the occupation of Berlin, which lies just 10 miles from the mapedge—the Battle of Dennewitz probably would not have taken place at all. A French Strategic Victory at Grossbeeren means no Battle of Dennewitz in the Campaign.

21.43 Historical Note: The VPs are based on the day’s objective of the French, to control the two towns as preparation for the final advance on Berlin.
22.0 BATTLE OF THE KATZBACH
A Perilous Passage, 26 August

22.1 Introduction
The battle of the Katzbach on August 26th 1813 was another meeting engagement; neither commander expected to find his opponent in the area. Cavalry dominated the battlefield as muskets would not discharge in the rain.

22.11 Duration: 10.00 - 20.00 hrs.
(May continue on Second Day of Battle, ending on 20.00 hrs., 27th Aug.)

22.12 Mode Cards at Start: 2 French, 1 Coalition

22.13 Card Deck, French—Remove from Deck:
1x “Alternate Reinforcements.”

22.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:
2x “Delay—March confusion;” 2x “Reinforcements Arrive Early,” 2x “Reinforcement Takes Other Route,” 1x “Random Entry,” 2x “Alternate Reinforcements”

22.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2
(Battle Game and Campaign)
Coalition 3; French 3.

22.2 Initial Set Up

22.21 French Set Up:
IIC/2 LC (2 units) within 4 hexes of (0814).
MACDONALD, XI (less 31st Div.) within 4 hexes of (0518).
LAURISTON, V (less 17th Div.—9 units) and IC/Dermon’s Bde., within 4 hexes of (0722)

22.22 Coalition Set Up:
Prussian I/C Katzele, Henkel, Bieber Ldw and 1,2 HA, within 2 hexes of (1317).
LANGERON, VI, IX, X Inf. Corps (see 22.33), and KORFF, I Cav. Corps, between Buschhausen (1028), Schlaupe (1622), and Herrmannsdorf (1627) inclusive. EXCEPTION: Grekov’s Bde (see 22.24).
BLÜCHER, YORCK, I Prussian Corps within 5 hexes of Alt Jauer (2727).
SACKEN, XI Russian Corps, and WASILTCHIKOW, Cavalry Corps, on the road south of Mahlitsch (2817).

22.23 Reinforcements:
FRENCH:
12.00—III/8th div., III/Beurman’s Bde., HA from (0109)
14.00—SEBASTIANI, remainder of IIC (5 units) from (0109). SOUHAM, remainder of III Corps (10 units + baggage) from (1801). EXCEPTION: 39th Div. (see 22.24).

COALITION:
No regular reinforcements.

22.24 Alternate Reinforcements:
FRENCH:
1. III/39th Div. from (1901)
2. Puthod’s 17th Division of V Corps was sent to guard the flank at Schönaul while Ledru’s 31st Division of XI was on the Queiss River. Both were guarding against St. Priest. 17th Div from 0116; 31st Div. from 0109. Add three turns to the die roll result specified on the card for the 31st Division’s Arrival Schedule.
3. MARMONT, VI Corps (13 units) from (0109)

COALITION:
1. IC/Grekov Cossack Bde. from (2334).
2. ST. PRIEST, VIII Corps from (1934).


22.26 Reduced Strength Units
FRENCH:
V/Harlet, Penne, Vachot; III/Vandedem, Charriere, Anthing, Stockhorn; XI/Henin, Zucchi.

COALITION:
Russian units:
XI/16th, XI/27th, C/2H, VI/18th, IX/15th, X/22nd, IC/Witt.

22.3 Special Rules

22.31 Thunderstorm: During all Thunderstorm turns the bridge at 2701 is marked with a “Burnt Bridge” Marker (washed-out). It cannot be repaired during a Thunderstorm turn. During all Thunderstorm turns the stream portion of the Katzbach may only be crossed at stream bridges (i.e., it is treated like a river). This portion of the Katzbach is indicated by a special stream symbol.

22.32 Battle on the 17th: Many units in this battle set-up at their reduced strength, due to the actions of the prior ten days. This same battlefield could have been contested on the 17th with almost the same forces had Ney so chosen. Set-up: Use the regular set-up and reinforcement information, but include: a) the French Player’s 17th and 31st division with their respective formations at start (they hadn’t been detached to the south as yet); b) Commander Ney—with the III Corps; and c) all units at Full Strength.

22.33 Langeron’s Formation: All the units of Langeron’s Formation (comprising three Russian Infantry Corps, VI, IX, and X) share the same officer Langeron and Langeron’s “L” baggage train.

22.34 Lauriston’s Command: Lauriston may command Dermoncourt’s brigade.
22.4 Victory Conditions

22.41 Control: To the player who controls the following hexes:
- 5 VP per hex of Kl. Tinz and Gr. Janowitz
- 3 VP per hex of Weinberg, Schlaupen, Hermansdorf.

23.0 THE BATTLE OF KULM
Enfilade in the Mountains, 29-30 August

23.1 Introduction
After the Battle of Dresden on 26-27 August, several French Corps began the pursuit of the defeated Coalition Army through the mountain passes leading back into Austrian territory. Vandamme’s I Corps, with two divisions of the best-trained conscripts of 1813, fought several rearguard actions with Ostermann’s Russians, and expected this battle to be no different. The Emperor had already heard rumors of Macdonald’s disaster on the Katzbach. With the possibility of having to defend his great depot of Dresden against an advance by both Bernadotte and Blücher, his hopes of being able to pursue far into Bohemia were vanishing.

23.11 Duration: 17.00, 29th Aug.—20.00, 30th Aug.
23.12 Mode Cards at Start: 1 French, 2 Coalition
23.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2: For the individual battle, the Coalition receives 3, the French 3.

23.2 Initial Set Up
23.21 French Set Up:
VANDAMME, I/21st LC Gobrecht, 32nd LC Rousseau (2715)
XIV/Mouton-D Bde (2315)
IC/1LC Pire, Montmr (2815)
IC/1LC Heimrodt, IC/4th HA (Italian, 2916)
I/Fesenzac, I/2nd-9th Art (2317)
I/Pouchelon (2516)
I/Bde Reuss (2214)
I/7th-8th Art., I/6th HA (2313)
I/Quiot (3507), I/4th Art (3706)
23.22 Coalition Set Up:
RUSSIANS:
BARCLAY (1816)
YERMOLOV (2017)
OSTERMANN, II/3 Schachowski (2117)
IIC/Schevich (1916)
V/Potemkin, V/Bistram (1915)
II/14 Roth (2015)
II/Art. (2016)
EUGEN, II/4 Pueschnitzki (2116)
IIC/Kretow (2118)
IIC/HA (2219)
GALITZIN, IIC/Depreradovitch (2319)
IIC/Duka (2420)
IIC/Baggage (2621)
IIC/baggage (1218)
RAEVSKY, III/1G (3 units) (1518)
III/baggage (1210)
AUSTRIANS:
Bde Sorbenberg (2520)
BIAIRCHI, H-Homburg (0807), Mariasy (0907), Qualenburg (0707), Art (0709).
COLOREDO, 1Au/Colloredo (0215), 1Au/Art (0412).

23.23 Reinforcements:
FRENCH:
29th 17.00—I/2nd div, (3 units) from (3701)
29th 18.00—XIV/Crefreuter, XIV/7th Art from (3701)
23.24 Second Day Reinforcements:
Game always continues for a Second Day.
PRUSSIANS:
30th 07.00—KLEIST, II Corps (9 units) from (1901).
23.25 Alternate Reinforcements: Draw from the following four groups in order. (Campaign Game Note: Any units already received at Grossbeeren or Katzbach may not arrive as Alt. Reinforcements now.)
FRENCH:
(1) MORTIER, YG/1st and YG/3rd divisions (8 units) from (3701); (2) the OG Div (3 units) from (3701); (3) ST. CYR, XIV (13 units) from (1901). (4) LATOUR, IC (less 1st LC Div; 9 units) from (1901) or (3701).
COALITION:
(1) CHASTELER, Au. 1 Res. Div. (3 units) from (0726); (2) NOSTITZ, Au. Cav. Div. (2 units) from (0726); (3) HOBENLOHE’S Div. (4 units) from (0726); (4) Rus. III/2G (3 units), III/Art from (0726).
23.27 Reduced Strength Units:
FRENCH: I/Reuss. (Deductions have been made for units in combat at Dresden, and for attrition.)
COALITION: II Rus/Pueschnitzki, II Rus/ Schachowski, II Prus/Pirch, II Prus/Kluex.
23.3 Special Rules

23.31 “Alto” Terrain

In contrast to the battlefields in the sandy plains of Brandenberg, Kulm lies on the southern shoulder of the Erz Gebirge. At 400-500 meters above the valley at Kulm, Alto terrain is a slightly sunken plateau running from Zinnwald to Hinter Tellnitz and on toward Peter-swalde. Alto terrain is treated like clear terrain (or, when attacked through a slope, as a hilltop). Alto terrain blocks the LOS of units on other Alto terrain. Any unit or leader on the edge of Alto terrain has a LOS over the lower-lying terrain down in the valley (and may see over but not into the woods lying on the slopes between) for a distance of up to [12] hexes.

23.32 Track-defile

Another terrain type that is proper to Kulm only, the Track-defile is not traversable by trains (including artillery) and costs 1 MP per hex for other unit types, if entered by a Track-defile hexside, regardless of other terrain. Artillery and Trains pay the cost of other terrain.

23.33 Map Exit

On the morning of the 29th, Vandamme sent five battalions to Aussig (off map) with a pontoon train, following an order of Napoleon to deploy the bridge on the Elbe there. The French Player can play the General Retreat Card and exit his forces from the map at hex 3921 in addition to his friendly Supply Source.

23.34 March Orders at Start: Both Players may issue March Orders to any on-map Friendly Forces (in effect at start).

23.4 Victory Conditions

23.41 Control: To the player who controls the following hexes:

- 5 VP per hex of Kulm, Sobochleben, and Priesten.

At the end of the first day, total all VPs achieved by both players and then reshuffle the card deck.

24.0 THE BATTLE OF DENNEWITZ

Collapse in the North, 6 September

24.1 Introduction

Marshal Ney’s Army of Berlin set out from Wittenberg on September 5th, side-stepping Bernadotte’s main body and driving Tauenzien’s IV Corps toward Seyda. That night they camped just off-map to the south, unaware that coalition forces were five miles away.

24.11 Duration: 09.00 6 Sept.—20.00 6 Sept.

24.12 Mode Cards at Start: 2 French, 2 Coalition

24.13 Card Deck, French:

(All cards in deck.)

24.14 Card Deck, Coalition—Remove from Deck:

2x “Lost” 2x “Thunderstorm,” 1x “Random Entry,” 1x “Early Start.”

24.15 Bonus Cards, Turn 2: For the individual battle, the Coalition receives 6, the French 3.

24.2 Initial Set Up

24.21 French Set Up:

In a Secure Road column (see 18.58) along the road from (1614) to Naundorf (2430) in the following order:

ARRIGHI, IIIC/5th LC (2 units), IV/24th LC & IV/24th HA, BERTRAND, IV/15th (4 units), VIII/Zoltowski, IVC/Krukowskii, IV/12th (4 units), IV/38th (4 units), IV/HA, IV/art. & baggage (see 24.51). (Zoltowski part of VIII Corps, was attached to IV Corps.)

24.22 Coalition Set Up


BÜLOW, III CORPS—within five hexes of Danna (0934); cavalry within ten hexes of (1234). All must be more than 12 hexes from French Supply Sources. EXCEPTION: III/5th Borstell (Reinforcement)

24.23 Reinforcements:

FRENCH
10.00 from (2925)—REYNIER, VII Corps
11.00 from (2914)—IIIC/4th, IIIC/HA
11.00 from (2918)—XII/29th LC, OUDINOT, XII/14th (3 units)
12.00 from (2918)—IIIC/6th LC (2 units), NEY, XII/13th (3 units), art., baggage
14.00 from (2918)—XII/29th (3 units)

COALITION all arrive at Kurzipsdorf (1433)
10.00—Prussian III/5th Borstell
13.00—Sw / Moerner Bde., HA
14.00—XIV / Kruper and Pahlen
15.00—XIV/21st, XIV/AvG (3 units)—total 4 units.
16.00—WORONZOW, XIV/14th Baggage Train
16.00—balance of Swedish Corps (6 units), STED-INGK.
17.00—balance of Russian XIV Corps (4 units)

EXCEPTIONS: XIV/24th is Alt. Reinforcement; III/Holtzendorf Art. does not appear.

24.24 Second Day Reinforcements:

(none). If the Second Day of Battle card is played, continue the battle until 20.00 hrs turn of Sept. 7th

24.25 Alternate Reinforcements:

Campaign Game Note: Any units already received at Katzbach or Kulm may not arrive as Alt. Reinforcements now (see 25.24).

FRENCH:
1. MORTIER, Imperial Guard (11 units—OG Div., 2nd and 4th YG Divs.) from (2910);
2. MARMONT, VI Corps (13 units) from (2910);
3. LATOUR, I CAV (8 units): 3LC, 1HC, 3HC Divs., Saxon HA from (2910).
4. Remaining Young Guard (8 units) from (2910).

COALITION
1. XIV/24th from (1433). 2. Wobes Ldw from (0801).
3. Hirsch Ldw from (0934).

24.26 Alternate Commander: FRENCH: Napoleon.
COALITION: (1) Bernadotte, (2) Winzingerode.

24.27 Reduced Strength Units:
FRENCH:
IV / Moroni, Belair, Hulot, Stockmayer, Spitzenberg
(Doring—PEU.)
VII / Brause, Bosch, Devaux, Menu, HAart.
XII / de Villeret, de Treille, Beaumont.
IIIIC / Jacquinot, Mouriez, Amiel.
IVC / Krukowski
COALITION:
III/Hessen; Swedish/Lagebring; XIV/21st Div.

24.3 Special Rules
24.31 Historical Note: The arrival of VII and XII Corps are based on Ney’s march plan, since “March Confusion” affected their historical arrival. Oudinot’s XII Corps was delayed when the VII Corps failed to show up at Gade gast.

24.32 Map Exit: Historians surmise that Ney’s objective was to exit the eastern mapedge on his way to a planned rendezvous with Napoleon at Luckau. If he plays the General Retreat Card, the French Player’s forces may exit at any of the following hexes: 0701, 0801, 0901, 1701, 1801, 1901, or 2901.

24.4 Victory Conditions
24.41 Control: For control of the following:
   • 5 VP per hex of Dennewitz (1411-1412)
   • 4 VP per hex of central Juterbog (0801-0802).
   • 3 VP per hex of Golsdorf (1816), Rohrbeck (1607) and Niedergorsdorf (1116-1216).

25.0 THE CAMPAIGN GAME

25.1 Introduction
The Campaign Game is the “Link Game.” Each Battle Game is played successively, in order.

25.11 Duration: The total number of turns in the four Battle Games.

25.13 Mode Cards at Start: (same as battle games.)

25.14 Card Deck: (same as battle games.)

25.15 Bonus Cards: Each victory in prior games will allow the winning player to draw “Bonus Cards” from his card deck at Kulm and Dennewitz (see 19.12). Each Strategic Victory: 3 Bonus Cards per battle Each Tactical Victory: 2 Bonus Cards per battle Each Marginal Victory: 1 Bonus Card per battle Minimum Bonus Cards: 3 per player. EXAMPLE: The Coalition Player wins a Marginal Victory at Grossbeeren, and a Tactical Victory at Katzbach. He would draw three “Bonus Cards” plus the regular card for a total of four cards, on turn two of Kulm. If in that situation the Coalition Player goes on to win a Strategic Victory at Kulm he would draw 6 Bonus Cards (plus one) on turn two of Dennewitz.

25.2 Initial Set Up
25.21 Grossbeeren: Separate units in the PEU box after Grossbeeren. These will be reduced units at Dennewitz.

25.22 Katzbach: Any Alternate Reinforcements that arrived at Grossbeeren will be unavailable.

25.23 Kulm: Any Alternate Reinforcements that arrived at Grossbeeren or Katzbach will be unavailable.

25.24 Dennewitz: The units in the PEU box at the end of Grossbeeren will be returned to play at reduced strength for Dennewitz; units in the UAR will be out of play. Any Alternate Reinforcements that have arrived at Katzbach or Kulm will be unavailable. Alternative Reinforcements that appeared at Grossbeeren are available again as Alternate Reinforcements.

25.3 Special Rules

25.4 Campaign Victory Conditions
The running total of Victory Points in all four battles is tallied for each side, and expressed as a Ratio.

25.41 Ratio of Grand Total Victory Points
(French : Coalition)
   less than 1 : 2 Coalition Decisive Victory
   less than 1 : 1 Coalition Victory
   less than 1.4 : 1 Draw
   less than 2.4 : 1 French Victory
   2.4+ : 1 French Decisive Victory
HISTORICAL NOTES
KEVIN ZUCKER

Background
After winning two major battles in the Spring of 1813, Napoleon agreed to an Armistice, ostensibly to prepare a path for peace, but actually to allow more time for recruiting his army. During the Armistice, Napoleon’s administration completed the organization of five new brigades and six divisions of light cavalry; three divisions of heavy cavalry; two of Young Guard infantry, one division of Guard Cavalry, one of Old Guard infantry, and seventeen line infantry divisions; a force equivalent in size to the entire Grande Armée of 1806.

The line infantry divisions comprised mainly youths officered by survivors of the campaigns in Spain and Russia and recalled old soldiers. They excelled in the use of cover such as woods or ravines. Dislike of the war increased up the ranks from Majors and up; the highest ranking officers hated it the most.

After failing to persuade Napoleon to accept very reasonable terms, the Austrian Emperor agreed to join the Coalition, effective the 12th of August; and so, despite the recruitment of his army, Napoleon was not only outnumbered but strategically surrounded by three large armies: Bernadotte’s Army of the North, Blücher’s Army of Silesia in the east, and Schwarzenberg’s Army of Bohemia. The Allies had devised the Trachtenberg plan by which any one of these armies would retreat when faced by Napoleon in person, coordinated with an advance by the other two Armies. This plan was the undoing of Napoleon.

With the expiration of the Armistice on the 15th, Napoleon ordered Marshal Oudinot to capture Berlin while he advanced eastward against the retiring Blücher. Schwarzenberg’s countermove toward Dresden caused the Emperor to turn command of the Army of the Bober over to Macdonald, ordering him to hold the river line and shield Oudinot’s advance. Instead Macdonald continued the offensive, crossing the swollen Katzbach stream in a driving rain on the 26th. Blücher caught him with half his army across and the Army of the Bober fell apart.

On the next day, at Dresden, the Emperor won his last major victory in Germany, costing the Coalition 35,000 men. During the pursuit into the mountains, General Dominique Vandamme with the French I Corps was caught between Ostermann’s Russians and Kleist’s Prussians, losing 15,000 men at the Battle of Kulm.

Coalition Forces, August 15th, 1813

The Prussian Army
in Silesia
Guard (inf. and cav.)—7,001 men, 16 guns
I Corps, Yorck—38,484 men, 104 guns
II Corps, Kleist—37,816 men, 112 guns
in Brandenburg
III Corps, Bülow—41,135 men, 80 guns
IV Corps, Tauentzien—33,170 men, 42 guns
Partisans (Lützow, Reiche, Schill)—4,068 men.
Siege Troops—30,070 men, 40 guns.

Landwehr
These troops were completely untried and their value unknown at the start of the campaign on August 15th. Bernadotte had little confidence in them, and Napoleon shared this opinion. “All this swarm of Cossacks and pack of bad Landwehr infantry will retreat to Berlin if your march is determined,” he wrote to Ney before Dennewitz.

The Russian Army
in Silesia
Langeron—34,551 men, 130 guns
Sacken—18,553 men, 60 guns
Wittgenstein—34,926 men, 92 guns
St. Priest—13,586 men, 36 guns
Guards & Reserve—44,347 men, 182 guns
in Brandenburg
Winzingerode, Woronzow, Tschernitschew—29,357 men, 92 guns
attached to Bülow—1,160 men, 22 guns
attached to Tauenzien—318 men
in Mecklenburg—6,525 men, 16 guns

The Austrian Army
in Bohemia—127,345 men, 280 guns
between the Ems & Traun—30,070 men
in the interior—35,557 men

Of the Austrian forces the cavalry was good, the artillery fairly good, but the infantry was “below the standard of the other armies, having neither the dogged pertinacity of the Russians nor the intense patriotism of the Prussians.” Two-thirds were recruits of three months training.

French Leaders
Of the eight original Corps Commanders of the Grande Armée, only Marmont, Mortier, Augereau and Ney were available in the theater. Bernadotte, become Crown Prince of Sweden, fought for the Allied cause.

2 The terms were: dissolve the Duchy of Warsaw, return Prussia’s and Austria’s lost provinces, abolish the Confederation of the Rhine, and restore the Hanseatic towns.

3 F.N. Maude, “The Leipzig Campaign.”
Davout—no longer the “Iron Marshal” of yore—defended Hamburg. Soult fought in Spain. Lannes had died in 1809.

**Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio**

Oudinot commanded the elite Grenadier division in 1806, expanded to the size of a small corps (21,000 men) in 1809. In 1812 he commanded the II Corps (37,000 men) and fought in battles around Polotsk. In 1813 he was given command of the XII Corps. He allowed his personal feelings to override his military judgement by “deliberately obeying” a catastrophic order of Marshal Ney at Dennewitz. “Though no doubt a capable commander of a division, perhaps even of a single corps, (he) was not of the calibre to command an army of 70,000 or 80,000 men. Whether any of Napoleon’s lieutenants was fit for it is perhaps doubtful. Of those then in Germany, Davout, Marmont, and St Cyr were alone possible. The last-named marshal says … ‘In my opinion there was not then in the whole of the belligerent armies a single man capable of commanding a greater number (than 50,000 men).’”

**Marshal Etienne Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum**

Served in Italy, and commanded Armies in Rome, Naples, and the Grisons. In 1809, he marched north and won his Marshal’s baton at the battle of Wagram. In independent command of the XI Corps in Russia, he accomplished little at the siege of Riga, but brought his French division back in good order. He was 48 years old in 1813. Like most other French generals he lacked the qualifications to lead an army.

**Gen. Dominique Vandamme, Count Unsebourg** Another excellent executive officer of a division who had been elevated to corps command. He spoke German, led the Bavarian Corps in 1807, the Württemberg Corps in 1809, and the Westphalians in 1812. His “genuine military talents were unfortunately somewhat blemished by manners too redolent of the camp, and an excessive violence of temper.” Believing he should at length obtain the rank of Marshal, he “hurried him beyond the bounds of prudence” at Kulm, failing to provide security for the rear of I Corps. Napoleon stated that a general should ask himself, several times a day: “What should I do if the enemy’s army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or on my left? If he have any difficulty in answering these questions he is ill-posted.”

**Marshal Michel Ney, Prince of the Moscowa**

A fairly good Corps commander, his executive ability was much-impaired in the absence of his long-time Chief of Staff, Antoine de Jomini, who departed during the Armistice to offer his services at Blücher’s headquarters. Ney, “the bravest of the brave” had a tendency to forget his rank and join the fray as a grenadier. He had many admirable qualities, but commanding an Army was not one of them.

**Coalition Leaders**

**Ivan Ostermann-Tolstoi, Count**

The grandson of Tsar Paul’s Chancellor, Ivan Andreyevitch Ostermann (his daughter married the grandfather of Lev Tolstoi), Ostermann distinguished himself at Eylau and Friedland (1807), Ostronovo and Borodino (1812) and at Bautzen (1813). At Kulm, his decision not to retreat saved the army. Reinforcements arrived after Ostermann attacked all afternoon, losing an arm to a ball while he was leading a counterattack of the Preobrashenski Regt.

**Crown Prince Karl Johan Bernadotte**

Commanded the I Corps of the French army in 1805-06, sent home by Napoleon after Wagram, traveled to Sweden where he became heir to the throne. Acted principally with an eye to preserving his Swedish Corps, in which he succeeded perhaps too well.

**Field-Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher**

Joined the Swedish Army at age 14, serving against Prussia in the Seven Years’ War. Later he was captured by a regiment of Prussian hussars, a unit which he then joined. An implacable foe of Napoleon, he was still a fiery hussar fifty years later. In 1806, after Auerstädt, Blücher marched to Lubeck only to capitulate at Ratkau. On his release he was received by Napoleon with marks of distinction. He defeated Marshal Macdonald at Katzbach and reached the rank of field marshal after Leipzig. His troops entered Paris on March 31, 1814. The next year he fought Napoleon at Ligny and arrived in the middle of the battle of Waterloo, insuring Napoleon’s defeat. For this his monarch made him Prince of Wahlstadt. He relied heavily on his chief of staff von Gneisenau.

**Friedrich H. F. Emil Kleist, Graf von Nollendorf**

Rose to prominence during the campaign of 1813. His arrival at Kulm surrounded Vandamme. He was present at Leipzig, and the following year fought at Joinvilliers where he was defeated, but his troops won the battle of Laon against Napoleon.

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4 Petre, F. Loraine, *Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany*, p. 180
5 L.A. Thiers, *History of the Consulate and Empire*, IX, p. 145
The Prussians had built a defense line south of the capital among the marshes between the Nuthe and Notte Rivers. This line was inadequately defended by two brigades, Borstell’s Fifth, in Mittenwalde, and Thümen’s Fourth, in Trebbin (just south of the Grossbeeren map outlined on page 18). Recent rains had flooded the region and rendered the road to Trebbin impassable.

On August 17th Oudinot concentrated two Corps at Baruth, 38 miles from Berlin. Reynier’s VII Corps joined the force on the following day. Leaving Bertrand in Baruth, Oudinot agreed to switch places with Reynier, taking the XII Corps on the 19th toward Luckenwalde on the left of the advance, with Reynier in the center, following trails to Schöenefeld. (Oudinot, as Army Commander, should have stayed centrally located.) Bertrand’s IV Corps, which had already marched from Peitz, had a short and direct route to Berlin, on the right.

Thümen, in Trebbin, reported Oudinot’s appearance. Bülow marched out of Berlin with two brigades to Klein Ziethen. Bernadotte ordered the Russians and Swedes away to the west, to Beeftlitz and Potsdam.

On the 21st, Bertrand marched to Sperenberg and Saalow, camping in the woods around Schünow. Reynier took Nunsdorf, and camped at Christinendorf. Oudinot and Arrighi attacked Trebbin at 1 P.M. and captured it in a four-hour skirmish. Thümen and Borsfel were exposed to defeat. The road to Berlin was now open.

Stedingk with the Swedish Corps was ordered to Saarmund, to meet Bülow’s two brigades there. Bernadotte believed that Napoleon was present with Oudinot’s Army, and wanted to withdraw over the Spree. Bülow refused to retreat, and Bernadotte agreed to remain south of Berlin until certain that Napoleon was present. He sent Bülow from Saarmund to Heinersdorf to block the road to Berlin, while the Swedes and Russians moved to Ruhlsdorf and Gütergotz.

Continuing his march, Oudinot prepared to cross the Nuthe Canal at Thyrow, Wilmersdorf, Wietstock and Jühnsdorf. XII Corps on the left, was to march via Ahrensdorf, VII Corps in the centre, via Grossbeeren, and IV Corps on the right, via Blankenfelde. The terrain, bisected by streams, gullies, marshes and woods precluded mutual support among the three columns.

Bülow ordered Thümen to Heinersdorf and (disobeying orders from Bernadotte) sent Borstell to Birckholz.

Allied outposts at Trebbin and Munsdorf were forced to retreat. At 3 P.M. on 23 August, Reynier’s VII Corps captured Grossbeeren and proceeded to bivouac for the day. Reynier’s right was secured by the

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**FOUR LOST BATTLES**
town of Grossbeeren and a canal just east of the town. On the left, in open ground, Reynier ordered Lecq to form a large divisional square protected by a few guns.

Approaching from the north, Bülow was determined to retake Grossbeeren.

The battle opened with an artillery duel at 5 P.M. Borstell’s Brigade attacked Grossbeeren from the east. At 6 P.M., Krafft’s Brigade was ordered to attack from the north, while Hessen-Homburg attacked the Saxons around the windmill height (in the fields west of Grossbeeren).

This concentric attack by three Prussian brigades was too much for Sahr’s Saxon Division. Falling back in disorder, the retreating Saxons took Durutte’s reinforcing Division with them. Both Sahr’s and Durutte’s Divisions took refuge in the woods south of Grossbeeren. An attempt by Lecq to take the windmill height failed. With two divisions in flight, Reynier had no choice but to order a retreat.

Meanwhile, at 8 P.M., Fournier’s Light Cavalry Division appeared on the scene. Half an hour later, Guilleminot’s 14th Division arrived. Both had been sent by Oudinot from Ahrensdorf to reinforce Reynier. However, it was too late. The battle was lost. Oudinot withdrew and Berlin was saved.

**Conclusion**

Clearly if the Emperor had led the advance on Berlin, the Prussian capital would have been his for the taking. All would then hinge on a great battle in the south. He would be marching to the recapture of Dresden instead of to its rescue. Meanwhile Macdonald’s collapse would enable Blücher to intervene on the Elbe by the 31st. Blücher and Schwarzenberg’s juncture would bring about the decisive battle of the campaign: a battle Napoleon would have had to win without the supplies stored in Dresden.

**THE KATZBACH CAMPAIGN**

Instead of heading north out of Dresden toward Berlin, Napoleon headed east, and reached Bautzen on the 16th. There he heard of the transfer of the Russian Army from Silesia to Bohemia.

In the evening of the 17th Napoleon was at Reichenbach, on the 18th at Görlitz. Here he learnt that Wittgenstein, with 40,000 Russians, had reached Bohemia, and that the Austrians had passed the Elbe for parts unknown. Napoleon moved to Zittau on the 19th, to get a clearer picture of the enemy’s intentions. During the day he went forward in person with a strong reconnaissance as far as Gabel, inside Bohemia.

He was back at Görlitz by 2 P.M. on the 20th, ready to move against Blücher. That evening the Prussian was

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6 See Table on page 23.
cross the Katzbach at Kroitzsch, then to cross the Niesse and march towards Jauer… V Corps (only two divisions) to advance from Goldberg by Seichau on Jauer along the left bank of the Neisse. He sent Puthod’s division of V Corps down the Goldberg-Schönau road (just off the game map) to reach Schönau on the 27th. Puthod was ordered to detach one brigade, which would cooperate with Ledru’s division of the XI Corps against St. Priest, who occupied Hirschberg.

“Before Blücher’s orders of 11 A.M. on the 26th issued, the two advancing armies had met and begun the battle.

“At the commencement the opposing forces were thus grouped—

“On the left bank of the Neisse, Langeron with 31,000 men faced Lauriston with 23,000. Langeron’s position ran from the Neisse along the Silberfliesz brook and the Plinsengrund.

“On the plateau of the right bank were the allied forces of Yorck and Sacken, 48,000 strong; against these were advancing, though much separated, the XI and III Corps, and Sebastiani’s cavalry, about 61,000 in all.

“Blücher was quite as surprised to find the French on the offensive as Macdonald was to find Blücher advancing.”

The French reached the plateau in two columns. Their cavalry, mingled in with their marching column, caused much confusion as it pressed forward through the infantry.

By 2 P.M. part of the XI Corps and Sebastiani had reached the line Klein Tinz-Gross Janowitz-Ober Weinsberg while the others were still struggling to climb onto the heights from the Neisse. Souham with the III Corps, which had been off marching on Dresden, had not yet reached the Katzbach.

Blücher advanced with Yorck’s men, encouraging them with the words, “I have enough French over there,” and telling them to use the bayonet, as their muskets would not go off in the heavy rain. A fierce hand-to-hand struggle ensued. “In one place the pile of overturned guns and ammunition wagons completely blocked the Nieder Krain road…. The whole of the French who had ascended the plateau from the Neisse were sent streaming down again in wild confusion. The river, which had been small in the morning, was now a raging torrent, in which many of the fugitives were drowned in attempting to cross it elsewhere than by the overcrowded bridge at Nieder Krain. That village was drowned in attempting to cross it elsewhere than by the raging torrent, in which many of the fugitives were

were sent streaming down again in wild confusion. The French who had ascended the plateau from the Neisse, blocked the Nieder Krain road…. The whole of the French reached the line Klein Tinz-Gross Janowitz-Ober Weinsberg. At the commencement the opposing forces were aware that the allied troops were especially bitter against them.”

Leaving Stolpen in his carriage at 5 A.M., the Emperor traveled 12 miles to reach the outskirts of Dresden by 8:30. There he mounted his horse to gallop across the bridge and into town, between 9 and 10 A.M. He received an ovation from troops and citizens alike, and proceeded to direct his last great victory.

**Coalition Forces**

The Allies marched on Dresden with over 120,000 men. Of these some 38,000 men were lost in the battle of the 26th-27th and the subsequent pursuit. The whole left wing beyond the Weisseritz—manned by the Austrians of Weissenwolf, Meszko and A. Liechtenstein’s columns—was practically destroyed. By the 29th the French had collected 12,535 prisoners in Dresden; this number had reached 23,518 (including 15,000 Austrians) by the 8th of October.

**French Forces**

Ist Corps (Vandamme) 31,610 on 15 Aug.

Two of the best-trained divisions of French Cohorts, with newly-added Conscripts; one division formed during the armistice of French conscripts. Plus cavalry, artillery and train. *Troupes en route*—1,415

Vandamme’s force at Kulm comprised the I Corps, above (less O’Meara’s brigade of Teste’s Div.); plus the 42nd Infantry Division, attached from XIV Corps; Corbineau’s cavalry; Reuss’s brigade on loan from II Corps; and the bridge train, taken up from Pirna, intended to be thrown across the Elbe further up.

The losses by French units at Dresden, that were near to the Kulm battlefield, are estimated below at a ratio of 20:1 (overall losses : officer losses). In addi-

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8 Petre, pp. 254-255.

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9 The Austrians lost at Dresden 1,164 dead, 5,405 wounded, 3,779 captured, and 5,442 missing.
tion, 12.25% of total strength was deducted from counter strength to represent attrition (roughly estimated at 1% per day from 15 August).

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**Topography**

The Erz Gebirge (“Ore Mountains”), a ridge running from the Elbe River SW along the Austro-Saxon frontier, has peaks above 2500 feet. From Aussig to Pirna the Elbe twists around this mountain chain in a horse-shoe bend.

Five roads traverse these mountains: (1) from Pirna through Peterswalde to Kulm; (2) from Maxen through Glashütte and Dittersdorf, Furstenwald and Muglitz to Priesten; (3) from Dippoldswalde to Altenburg, Zinnwald, Eichwald and Teplitz; (4) the main road to Dux; (5) the road from Marienberg to Komotau.

**From Dresden to Kulm**

After their defeat at Dresden, the Coalition forces were struggling back across the Erz Gebirge via the roads named above into Bohemia. The French pursued, hampered by a lack of cavalry, in several columns: (1) Murat, driving straight west toward Freiburg. (2) Marmont, whose orders were late, to follow the enemy main body on Dippoldswalde; (3) St. Cyr on Dohna and Maxen; (4) Mortier with the Young Guard following the Elbe toward Pirna, where initially Napoleon planned to move his HQ; (5) Vandamme advancing toward Berggieshübel on the Peterswalde road. On the 27th his I Corps was still crossing the Elbe at Königstein, Mouton-Duvernet at Pirna, Philippon near Krietschwitz, and Corbineau’s cavalry between Hennersdorf and Berggieshübel.

The original orders for the Coalition retreat were drafted by staff officers Toll and Radetzky, at 4 P.M. on August 27th. These called for three separate columns:
- Barclay de Tolly via the Peterswalde road. To avoid Vandamme, Barclay instead ordered:
  - Russo-Prus. Reserves via Zinnwalde, Peterswalde or by Maxen if Vandamme stood in the way;
  - Kleist’s Prussians via Glasshütte;
  - Wittgenstein’s Russians as rearguard on the heights of Leubnitz (Klüx) and Prohlis.
- The Austrians east of the Weisseritzer River (i.e., Chasteler, Colloredo, Nostitz, Bianchi and Hohenlohe) would retreat by the Zinnwalde Road. They reached Altenberg on the 28th, and Dux on the 29th. Their rearguard under M. Liechtenstein was at Wendisch Carlsdorf on the 28th, Falkenhain on the 29th, and Altenberg early on the 30th.
  - Klenau with the Left Wing (Czöllich and A. Liechtenstein with the remains of Mesko, Bianchi, Crennerville and Weissenwolf) was ordered via Tharandt and Freiberg to Marienberg and Komotau. Due to Murat’s advance, Klenau moved by Potschappel, Gittersee and Rabenau to Pretzschendorf on August 28th; Waltersdorf on the 29th; and Marienberg on the 30th.

Convinced that the Coalition main body was going by Dohna and Dippoldswalde, Napoleon hoped to reach Teplitz by the shorter and better road through Peterswalde, with the three nearest corps of Vandamme, Mortier, and St. Cyr. Reaching Teplitz, first he would inflict great damage on their columns as they debouched in disorder from the mountain passes, pursued by the rest of his army. He rode off to Pira intending to arrive early on the 30th.

However, at 4:30 P.M. on the 29th he received reports that the “enemy army is retiring by Altenberg on Teplitz,” and, concluding that Vandamme would not encounter any serious opposition near Kulm, he redirected Mortier and St. Cyr, and returned, himself, to Dresden.

That day, Vandamme fought a series of actions on the Peterswalde road against Eugen of Württemberg and Osterman with the Russian Guard. Starting out in the morning at Hellendorf, there were rearguard actions at Peterswalde, Nollendorf, and Vorder Tellnitz.

**The Battle of Kulm**

Vandamme took possession of the town at 10 A.M. His troops were still spread-out in a long column in the pass over the mountains. Expecting “another small rearguard action like those he had already had earlier in the morning, he sent Reuss’ brigade to try and cut the Russians from the mountains by their left.” 10 Ostermann had 14,700 men with his left on the wooded heights above Straden (2013), his centre in and west of Priesten (2317), and his right between Priesten and Karwitz (2419).

Vandamme took Straden but was quickly thrown back. Then, as nine battalions of the 42nd division arrived, it was taken again. With more troops arriving, Vandamme advanced against Priesten, took the village and then lost it again.

At 2 P.M. Philippon arrived with fourteen fresh battalions. Priesten was once again taken, and lost, by Vandamme. At 5 P.M. Vandamme made his decisive attack. But Coalition reinforcements under Barclay...

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10 Petre, p. 234
were now beginning to arrive, particularly cavalry, and drove the French back.

In the mountains Marmont, following Wittgenstein, reached Falkenhain on the Zinnwald road. St. Cyr, following Kleist, had a sharp fight with him at Glashütte. Following an order of Napoleon, St. Cyr continued by the Rheinhartsgrimma valley, leaving Kleist on his own and unpursued.

During the night elements of Vandamme’s force continued to arrive. Several columns of Coalition troops were nearby: Colloredo and Bianchi south of Teplitz, Chasteler on the road to Dux, Wittgenstein on the heights of Altenberg. The head of Kleist’s column reached Furstenau (1105).

Proceeding directly to Ebersdorf (1909), Kleist learned that the direct roads over the Geiersberg, by Graupen (1216) and (1813), were blocked by friendly troops. The other forest roads, running through deep valleys, were impracticable for large forces, so Kleist chose to march through Streckenwald (2603) to Nollendorf (3603) and cut his way through Vandamme’s Corps.

His orders were for assembly at 3 A.M. The troops set out at 5, and by 8 A.M. they had reached Nollendorf, but confusion caused delays and the head of the column only began to appear around the bend (3507) about 11 A.M.

The fighting at Kulm resumed at 7 A.M. Vandamme had his right up in the hills above the Eggmühl, his centre across the Teplitz road in front of Kulm (2714), and his left stretching as far as Böhmisich Neudörfel (3019). After his losses of about 6,000 on the previous day Vandamme had about 32,000 soldiers remaining. Having suffered equal losses, the Coalition forces facing him numbered about 44,000 men.

After taking the Striesowitz Berg, the Russians began to move on Arbesau (3212). Vandamme set up a defensive flank with Quiot’s and Duhesme’s brigades, and Kulm itself seemed untenable.

At that critical moment, cannon shots were heard from the direction of Tellnitz. Vandamme believed Mortier still had orders to support him from Pirna, and was convinced the guns were French; very soon he realized the truth. Deciding to abandon his artillery, he fought his way through Kleist’s Corps about Schande, Arbesau and up the highway. The Prussian Landwehr troops were terrified to see a mass of French cavalry and infantry surging their way. They moved aside and were unable to prevent part of the French escaping. Kleist himself only escaped capture by taking by-paths through the woods. But Vandamme was captured as he sought to escape alone into the hills.

The Emperor finally ordered Mortier to support Vandamme on the 30th, when it was too late. Had the order been dispatched by 5 P.M. on the 29th Mortier could have reached Peterswalde early on the morning of the 30th, and attacked Kleist at Nollendorf.

Marmont drove Wittgenstein’s rear-guard from Altenberg, and again from the Zinnwald plateau (0807). Reaching almost up to Eichwald (0118), in the evening he heard through St. Cyr, in Furstenwalde, of Vandamme’s disaster.

The French I Corps had been nearly destroyed. Prisoners numbered 8,000 to 10,000 and 5,000 were killed or wounded, 66 guns, 200 wagons and generals Haxo, Guyot and Heimbrot captured. By Sept. 2 the I Corps, that had numbered 33,000, had only 8,400 survivors. The Austrians lost 817 men, the Russians 9,000, and the Prussians 1,500.

Conclusion

Knowing his own worth in battle and the miraculous effect of his presence on the young troops, the Emperor stands accused of not going where the action was.

Why was Napoleon not in personal command at any of these battles? The Emperor could not be everywhere, but might have been present at two, if not three of them. He might have been at the battle of the Katzbach—he had just been with Macdonald days before that battle. He could have planned on going with Oudinot to Berlin. Had he been with Vandamme and Mortier at Kulm, the damage to the Bohemian army would have been severe.

He originally planned to follow up behind Vandamme with the guard, so he could better evaluate the intelligence he was getting. He changed his mind, some authors speculate, because of a dish of rabbit with garlic that made him feel ill. Perhaps it was the news of the first two defeats. Anyway he returned to Dresden instead of leading the pursuit.

Napoleon is out of step in this campaign, allowing the Coalition to hold the overall initiative and control events, while he is reduced to delayed reactions, usually to cancel or weaken an offensive of his own—the only thing that could restore to him the initiative.
THE BERLIN THEATER OF WAR, 1813

By the end of August, Napoleon’s strategy was in disarray. With Oudinot’s reverse at Grossbeeren, Bernadotte was free to descend on the communications of the Grande Armée and its vital supply barges on the Elbe. To parry this threat the Emperor was determined to secure his northern flank by capturing the Prussian capital. Leaving four corps at Dresden under Marshal Murat, Napoleon prepared to move north with the Imperial Guard, a portion of the I Cavalry Corps, and others. These units, numbering 18,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry as they reached Grossenhain on the 31st, were recalled to Dresden upon tidings of Vandamme’s reverse at Kulm.

On September 2nd, Ney was placed in charge of the Army of Berlin and ordered to march to Baruth by the sixth, to attack Berlin on the ninth or tenth. Ney was instructed to avoid Oudinot’s mistake: “He was so clever that he allowed one of his corps to be isolated and defeated. If he had boldly attacked the enemy, he would have defeated him everywhere.” The Emperor was prepared to resume his march on Luckau to support the offensive on Berlin, but a renewed offensive by Blücher caused him to delay the Guard’s march on Luckau and again to recall the troops that had already set out. He promised Ney on the 3rd that he would quickly march on Berlin after dealing with Blücher, but only started to move the VI Corps and I Cavalry Corps north early on September 6th. (This move was cancelled again with news of Schwarzenberg’s advance toward Dresden.)

Marshal Ney, still believing in a junction with Napoleon, started the offensive with an eastward move toward Dahme. On September 5th Oudinot’s Corps advanced to Zahna, Reynier to Büllzig and Bertrand to Euper. At Zahna, General Dobschütz’s twelve battalions, supported by cavalry and artillery, were driven back upon Zallmsdorf. The French bivouacked for the night at Leetza, Zallmsdorf and Sayda, Seehausen and Naundorf.

The Prussian von Bülow ordered his Third Corps to Werkzahna in order to shadow Ney’s advance on its left. However, Borstell’s 5th Brigade was retained by Bernadotte to cover the defiles of Köpnick, Woltersdorf, Werkzahna and Kropstädt, depriving Bülow of a quarter of his strength. Bülow’s cavalry reached Kurlipsdorf in the evening—one mile from the French IV Corps at Seehausen and Naundorf—followed by his three brigades and guns, which arrived by daybreak. Bernadotte ordered the Swedes and Russians to concentrate at Lobbesse.

On the 6th Ney continued his march toward Dahme, with Reynier moving on Rohrbeck and Bertrand marching through Dennewitz to reach Jüterbog. Oudinot was ordered to Öhna, but to await VII Corps’ passage first through Gadegast. Reynier directed his VII Corps, meanwhile, to march direct on Dennewitz, and so did not appear.

From a hill, Bülow himself observed Bertrand’s IV Corps marching along the main highway toward Dennewitz. He ordered his Corps to Eckmannsdorf, where
a chain of low hills provided cover for an attack, each brigade forming two lines with the right on Dahna and the left on the road to Dalichow.

At 9 AM the lead units of Bertrand’s column crested the chain of hills south of Dennewitz. Tauenzien, who attempted to maneuver around Bertrand’s column to unite with Bülow, was caught in the open plain northeast of Dennewitz. Bülow advanced with Thümen’s brigade on his left and Krafft on the right, marching past Kaltenborn to Niedergörsdorf. The marshy Ahebach stream, fordable only with difficulty, divided the battlefield. A strong southwest wind created swirling dust clouds that intermittently reduced visibility to 100 yards.

Tauenzien’s single reserve infantry and four Landwehr regiments were driven back—the Kurmark Landwehr broke and ran. He launched his nine squadrons of Landwehr cavalry against Fontanelli’s Italian Division which succumbed to this unexpected charge. French cavalry under Lorge, sent to break up the charging Prussians, were thrown back through their supporting infantry in turn. Finally the experienced Morand stopped the Prussians in their tracks. But the panic continued to spread through Dennewitz, infecting Bertrand’s baggage train.

During the respite following the Landwehr’s charge, Bülow deployed his corps from Niedergörsdorf, causing Ney to withdraw upon Dennewitz. The fate of the battle then devolved upon control of the hills northwest of the town, the commanding Denkmalsberg and the adjacent Windmill Hill. Morand was driven off the hills and back into a gully between the Windmill Hill and the Pine thicket. Supported by Durutte’s division, just arrived (from VII Corps), Morand retook the Windmill Hill until forced off by Prussian guns on the Denkmalsberg.

Ney refused to abandon the ground north of the Ahebach, counting on the arrival of Reynier and Oudinot to redress the balance of forces. The arriving VII Corps deployed between Dennewitz and Gölsdorf; while further reinforcements drove the Prussians from Gölsdorf. Panic was beginning to spread in the Prussian ranks.

Borstell had spent the morning awaiting permission from Berndadotte to leave his assigned position. Marching to the sound of the guns, he arrived at 3 P.M., deploying west of Gölsdorf.

A Saxon advance beyond Gölsdorf would decide the battle, and the approaching Swedes could not arrive in time to stop them (some Swedish cavalry and horse artillery were in time to join in the pursuit).

Seeking to regain the northern sector, Ney sent Durutte’s second brigade against the Dennewitz Windmill Hill, against a murderous fire from the Denkmalsberg. Outflanked by Thümen’s troops from the Pine Thicket, they were forced to relinquish the hilltop again. By 4:30, Durutte’s division was back behind the Ahebach.

Still determined to reach Jüterbog, Ney ordered Bertrand into one more attempt. Fatally depriving the Saxons of their moral support, he called-up Oudinot’s XII Corps toward Dennewitz.

To restore his own morale, Bülow ordered his right wing to advance. This attack, corresponding with Oudinot’s withdrawal, spelled the end of Ney’s offensive. Krafft’s Prussians pried the village away from Lecoq’s Saxon troops by 4 P.M. The Prussians lost 40 officers and 1,228 casualties in retaking Gölsdorf; and 49 officers and 1,318 men in storming the hills north of the village. The Saxon defenders lost 1,500.

The victory cost the Bülow 6,700 men, plus 3,000 in Tauenzien’s Corps. The Army of Berlin lost 8,000 dead and wounded, 13,500 prisoners, 53 guns, and 412 wagons—a third of the army.
DESIGN NOTES

ALESSANDRO FONTANA di VALSALINA

*Four Lost Battles* explores some of the greatest “what-ifs” of the Napoleonic Wars.

When the Allies decided to use the Fabian strategy to avoid direct engagement with Napoleon, while trying to defeat his generals instead, nobody could have imagined the success this would have.

With the notable exception of Spain, the French generals and marshals proved very able on different occasions. What would have happened, if Napoleon had supported them in person? The bad weather, young soldiers without experience, insufficient cavalry, almost 20 years of wars, the violent hatred of Russians and Prussians: all were important in these battles. Both sides made big mistakes although the forces, at least on paper, were balanced.

The aim of a designer should be to recreate the historical problem facing the opposing commanders at set up while the so-called “quid obscurum” of battles (Victor Hugo) is completely simulated by the ability of the player in conjunction with the luck of the die.

With these ideas, we wanted to design this quad with the *Napoleon’s Last Battles* system.

*NLB* is one of the most beautiful wargames ever created. It encompasses opposites and contains a balance among different elements: it is easy and difficult, dynamic and static, requiring ability and luck. It can be short or long, it depends on the scenarios, but anyway it is always amusing. The only “negative” element that if today you are not lucky (you always roll a “6”) you will finish the game with your blood pressure at 250! Many complain about the luck element of *NLB*.

But recently a friend of mine amazed me by saying “*NLB* is like playing chess!” Only the best players win consistently.

In *NLB*, “fortune favors the brave.” The risk-taking wargamer with the better plan almost always wins and this is the aim that everyone should have. *NLB* is a game that over the years gave me great satisfaction. Thanks to *NLB* I met good friends at many game conventions.

The original idea to design “some battles that we will never see” came from Stefano and Umberto, two friends who began to design the battle of “Piave 1809.”

In some way I took up their charge and designed eight battles. *NLB* can become a mania, but in reality what we enthusiasts have in common is the love of history, and enjoying each other’s company with something easy and pleasant.

I would like say “grazie” to all the persons who contributed to this design. Thank you friends: I dedicate this game to all of you—the many who, directly or indirectly, contributed to its creation.

To all who have promoted the *NLB* system all these years:

- New England Simulations, Decision Games, and Clash of Arms.
- The Anschluss staff for their wonderful books.
- Scott Bowden and R. M. Epstein for their painstaking researches.
- George Nafziger, author of 3 volumes on the 1813 campaign.
- Umberto “Santo Martire” who published the early drafts of these battles in the *Torneo Master*, and Pierluigi “Pigi” who with patience created our playtest counters.

Above all I want to thank the terrific playtesters.

Claudio “Bafo,” Alberto “Il Conte,” Stefano “ghicipopoci!” Lodovico “Mr. Regolamento,” Gianmarco “ho battuto il Bafo a Blue Max!” Franco “Gufo Bulgaro,” Enrico ”io abito molto distante dal club!” Pierpaolo “oggi non combino!” Francesco ”io amo giocare a NBL!” Gabriele “verme solitario,” Giampi ”no xe per barca,” Alberto ”il bergamasco,” Fabrizio “culandrone,” Fabio “Gabriele me la pagherai!” Gianni ”schiavo del suo capo,” Marco ”come mia mamma non cucina nessuno!” Paolone ”mo ci sono le pesche al vino!”

Last but not least, Silvana, who supports me in my enthusiasm.
DESIGN NOTES

KEVIN ZUCKER

Alessandro Fontana created the original version of the four battles in this package because of a love of what he is doing. These four critical battles share an accidental quality, unlike the massive battles of Lützen and Bautzen in the Spring, and Dresden and Leipzig in the Fall—and occurred without Napoleon in person. It’s like Quatre-Bras or Wavre, with only Ney and Grouchy. While the Allies attacked desperately in the Emperor’s absence, the French Marshals failed to help each other when their master’s eyes were not upon them. The outcome of these battles more than erased the French victory at Dresden, and led inexorably to Leipzig.

The basics of the four battles are the same as Napoleon’s Last Battles. All leadership and command rules remain the same. As in Last Battles Leaders can fail, and units can be wasted, leaving players hesitant to commit them, like the real generals.

But since NLB time has not stood still. From Seven Days of 1809 and other games in the “Days” Series, we borrowed rules for Hidden Forces, Vedettes, Leader Escorts, March Orders, Road March, Trains, Repulse, Shock Combat, Heavy Cavalry and Bombardment (with a new Bombardment Table).

Then came the real challenge of this design. In most wargames, the force structure and arrival schedule is not a mystery. Everyone on both sides knows exactly who is coming. But in the Napoleonic era, the uncertainty faced by commanders on both sides played an important role in the way battles developed. In these four battles nobody really knew where the enemy was and in what strength, or even which other friendly corps might be arriving. We have used the cards to provide a taste of this uncertainty. The player will not really know whether he’s facing all the troops he’s eventually going to face and from which direction they will come.

In the Battle of Kulm uncertainty will play the largest role. Vandamme thought Mortier and even St. Cyr might be joining him. Instead, he got Kleist coming up behind him. When he began the engagement there was only one weak Allied corps in front of him. He ended up facing more than 40,000 enemies, even before Kleist arrived.

The deployment cards keep your reinforcement schedule hidden from you and the other player. Still, the French Player will know more than Vandamme knew.

That will make it possible to arrive on the battlefield more cautiously. He’s going to know what forces are within striking distance of the battlefield, and will make allowances. If Vandamme had had scouts combing through those mountains in other directions, he would have had plenty of time to withdraw from the battle—possibly toward Aussig and safety behind the Elbe River—before Kleist arrived.

The second goal of the cards is to reveal in the Campaign Game how success or failure on one battlefield impacted the other battles. That is done through the provision of additional “Bonus Cards.”

If you have a copy of Struggle of Nations (published by AH and long out of print), you will see each of the four battles taking in an area of eight by ten miles (4 x 5 hexes on that map). We studied the campaign on the SoN map to determine the attrition the forces would have suffered before arriving in battle.

LINE OF SIGHT

On a completely flat surface such as the ocean, the horizon is seven miles distant. The means of communication of the time would not allow the control of large forces at that range, even though one might be able to catch a glimpse of something through a gap in the trees and hills.

COMMAND AND TIME

A lot can happen in a short hour’s duration. Units may await orders for minutes on end, then start in motion at a rate of up to 3 miles per hour (on roads), potentially attacking from the march (that has to take some time). It is unlikely that a single unit could march for more than 30 minutes in a turn when it also attacks.

COMMAND RADIUS

An army is an organism. It can only move in certain ways. It has to move in a coordinated way, and it has to remain in a relatively compact formation in order to be coordinated. Coordination on the battlefield comes from the top down, through the chain of command.

By the time word of an event reaches the commander, he issues an order and sends it off, 15 minutes may have been lost, hence the 4-hex Command Radius (just over one mile). The officer’s 3-hex radius is based on keeping his entire corps in visual contact; he has to see in order to coordinate the action of his units. Possibly the officer’s radius should be subject to LOS, blocked by crests and woods, but to avoid imposing a burden on the
players, some latitude was allowed for the use of gallop-
er s in the case of officers too.

An aide carrying an order can reasonably travel about 5.6 miles (18 hexes) on the battlefield in one hour. That is the figure we have traditionally used. However, we found the rate of travel reduced in 1809, partly because of the “cumbrous troopers” borrowed for the staff from Nansouty’s Heavy Cavalry Division. These rates varied depending upon whether orders were dispatched and received during the day (range 4.2–8 mph; avg. 6.1 mph) during the night (range 1.2–5.7 mph; avg. 3.13 mph), or dispatched night and received day (range 0.8–2.6 mph; avg. 1.7 mph).

The most significant complication for the courier is when the recipient HQ is on the move. The average speeds above do not reflect wrong turns taken in trying to follow in its wake.

A table in van Creveld’s Command in War on page 88 covers 11-12 October, 1806. The speeds there are significantly higher: range 4.5–5.8 mph; avg. 5.6 mph; dispatched night/arrived day.

We don’t have any data on 1813 but have retained 5.6 mph in the rules, guessing that 1809 was an aberration because of the torpid pace of the mounts.

Once an order arrives, how long did it take to re-
spond? If it was an order to march, the time lag before the start of the march ranged from one-half to four hours; average was 1:20.

MARCHES
Infantry Marches are based upon an average speed of 2.4 mph over roads. At 14 hours per day a unit could cover 28.8 miles, including two one-hour halts in that period. A normal march would take 8 hours on the road and two at rest (19.2 miles), then Forced March would add another 4 hours and another 10 miles or so.

The rules on Command and Initiative, in conjunc-
tion with the Cards, will cause most forces to sit on their heels from time to time, if only to catch their breath.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marches</th>
<th>accéléré</th>
<th>Lt. Inf.</th>
<th>ordinaire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steps</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pace x36&quot;</td>
<td>3,600&quot;</td>
<td>2,550&quot;</td>
<td>2,880&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meters x55</td>
<td>91.46</td>
<td>64.78</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hexes</td>
<td>5030m</td>
<td>3560m</td>
<td>3186m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPs</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Note: “Steps” is steps per minute. “Pace” is the length of stride, estimated. (A military pace varies between 30" and 36" on good quality road.)
(continued from page 2)

It is the most difficult to assess Attrition. We created March Tables for each formation to determine its rate of march (this would tell us whether it suffers for extra long marches at Forced March rates).

Here is the March Table that we used to determine Macdonald’s Attrition prior to Katzbach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Souham</th>
<th>Lauriston</th>
<th>Macdonald</th>
<th>Sebastiani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13 PM</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 PM</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>125 men</td>
<td>4 MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 PM</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4 MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 PM</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>125 men</td>
<td>5 MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 PM</td>
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<td>1,500</td>
<td>4 MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 PM</td>
<td>Bunzlau</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>4 MP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 PM</td>
<td>375 men</td>
<td>125 men</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 PM</td>
<td>Bunzlau</td>
<td>Lowenberg</td>
<td>Lowenberg</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 PM</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>125 men</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 PM</td>
<td>Haynau</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 PM</td>
<td>375 men</td>
<td>3.5 MP</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 PM</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>-0-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 N</td>
<td>Liegnitz</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attrition losses for this period: 13,000 men

Not shown: the 35th Division’s 2nd Bde which starts at Lahn.

Combat Losses in the Silesian Campaign

("Fr" means the French Army of the Bober and "Co" means Blücher’s Army of Silesia.)

Estimated losses in men, killed and wounded, with prisoners included where known.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Fr.</th>
<th>Co.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goldberg (Rochlitz), 17 Aug</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blücher's Adv Gd (Lobenthal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siebeneichen, 18 Aug</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italians - 2,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Siebeneichen, 19 Aug</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolfshavn, 19 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>French 10th Div, 11th Div - 3,000</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>k/w</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian 27th Div.</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bunzlau (Modelsdorf), 21 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>French 8th Div, 9th Div, II Res. Cav - 2,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>k/w</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sacken</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>k/w</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plagwitz, 21 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>French V Corps, 16th Div. - 1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yorek (Karl v Meck) and Kapzevich (X Corps)</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lauterseifen and Pilgramsdorf, 22 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Pursuit of Blücher) - 1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Goldberg, 23 Aug</td>
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<tr>
<td>French V Corps - 3,000</td>
<td>1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mecklenburg's Bde</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>k/w</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wolfshberg Hts, 23 Aug</td>
<td>4094</td>
<td>5188</td>
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<td>Subtotal of losses listed above</td>
<td>4094</td>
<td>5188</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat losses for this period</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>8000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attrition</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL LOSS</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
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