THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN

“They still believed him fortunate at the moment when he was beginning to be so no longer, when a ray of sadness had already shot into his daring and intrepid heart.”

Napoleon’s Quagmire, 1809
Map Patch • Get the most from the Spanish

Napoleon’s Resurgence, 1813
Work in Progress • Pre-Order NOW!
Operations

Kevin Zucker

Every Napoleonic operation included these eight basic steps, from advance to contact to pursuit after battle...

1. searching for the enemy.
2. re-directing the columns to the expected battlefield (day 5)
3. active operations, closed-up columns move slowly to engage.
4. the battle, part I (day 7)
5. forced march, last minute arrivals
6. the battle, part II
7. retreat/night (day 8)
8. pursuit

Steps 3—6 are currently within the purview of TLNB; however, we would like to expand that.

Getting information on the enemy was the most important element to success. If the enemy knows more about your movements than you do about his, you have to be extremely careful to avoid being caught en flagrant delit, scattered and exposed to defeat in detail. Lützen is similar to Friedland, with the Coalition thinking that they have found easy pickings, a stray unsupported French formation, only to find Napoleon arriving to spoil the party. He usually kept his formations within supporting distance of each other, for just this reason.

Cavalry is important during steps 1, 2, 7, and 8. If the battle occurs in open terrain, an army unsupported by cavalry such as Napoleon's in 1813 would find itself the target of numerous charges, forcing high-density targets. There was (cont’d on page 21)
CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON

An Overhaul of the NATC Organization Displays

Christopher Moeller

One of my holy grails as a graphic designer has been to give the Organization Displays in the Campaigns of Napoleon series an upgrade.

The Campaign Organization Displays are terrific at doing most of what they set out to do, but you may encounter friction when calculating unit strengths for combat and march attrition, particularly for leaders with subordinates. This is something that players encounter several times per turn. Players are required to add up their force commander’s units, then search out each subordinate and add up the strength ratings of that leader’s units, before finally consulting a complex attrition table. In my experience, this is where a significant amount of struggle happens in the play of the game, so it’s where I focused my efforts.

My first thought was to substitute strength counters for tracks. Adding up a sequence of numbers is easier than converting locations on a track into numbers and then doing the math.

My second thought, in an attempt to mitigate the problem of consulting multiple leader tracks, was to consolidate each leader’s subordinates into one display. That led to an “aha” moment; if leaders weren’t required to move to the map, they wouldn’t each require their own track, freeing them to cluster on one display together. That line of thinking led to the idea of adding an additional “formation” layer to the command structure of the game, placing formation counters on the map instead of leaders. Formations would be empty shells, forming and disbanding at will, pointing to clusters of leaders on the organization display. Now, instead of looking at multiple leader tracks to calculate the size of a force when moving or fighting, all of the information would be in one place.

This removes the source of the friction: players will be able to consult one set of numbers in one location on the display before making their attrition roll. This is a draft, which I’m testing out with the Thursday Night Gamers in our Napoleon at the Crossroads game. For the curious, the rules for the upgrade are as follows.

(next page)
FORMATION COUNTERS
When using Formation counters, leaders are never placed on the map, they only appear on the organization display. Formation counters are placed on the map. Any formation that is not being used has its marker flipped over on the formation's command box, indicating that the formation is inactive. Inactive formations may be brought into being at any time, by having a leader assume leadership of it.

Note that rules [64]-[76] in the standard rules are somewhat different:

Subordinate leaders are placed on the display of the formation of which they are a member. They are then eligible to become independent at any time by assuming leadership of an inactive formation.

The leader commanding the formation is placed in the formation's command box. His command span is the limiting factor of the number of subordinate leaders and organic units the formation can hold.

Organic units are placed first, going from left to right, in the formation's white boxes, with strength points indicated in the gray boxes beneath. Subordinate leaders are placed in the light gray band, with their organic units placed beneath them, from left to right, starting with the space beneath the subordinate leader. Multiple subordinates may be organized in this way until the formation's command span is exhausted.

To assume leadership of an inactive formation, a subordinate officer is moved to the formation's command box, and his units are placed in that formation's unit boxes. Place the newly activated formation marker on the map in the hex occupied by the commander's prior formation.

Major Generals may be formed at any time. They generally use the cavalry/infantry detachment formations, but could theoretically assume leadership of any available formation.

Limits: Note that Leaders can subordinate, and units move from one formation to another, only during the organization and consolidation phases as normal.

SPECIAL RULES SUMMARY
pages 5 and 6

Permission to photocopy
Napoleon at the Crossroads: Special Rules Summary

**Battle Sequence**

1. **FORCED MARCH:** non-phasing player may attempt to move his units by initiative.
2. **REVEAL FORCES:** Both players reveal their forces, and leaders involved on both sides. Vedettes may retreat before combat.
3. **APPROXIMATE STRENGTH:** Both players reveal approximate strength points, rounded off to the nearest 5.
4. **BATTLE TYPE:** Both players pick battle type (Pursuit or Pitched).
5. **REVEAL STRENGTH:** Reveal total strength of both sides: Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery.
6. **CAVALRY SUPERIORITY:** if one side has 2:1 advantage in cavalry SP’s, it gains cavalry superiority.
7. **BOMBARDMENT:** both players resolve artillery fire.
8. **STAKE THE GUARD:** The French player may choose to stake the Old Guard if they are present.
9. **ATTACK RESOLUTION:** Roll the die, comparing non-artillery strength points as a ratio. Bold results on the CRT indicates which side loses.
10. **LOSER REVEALS BATTLE TYPE:** If Pursuit, the loser retreats and the victor pursues. If Pitched, both players lose SP’s as indicated and the defender counterattacks.

   Pursuit battles end here. Pitched battles continue:

11. **COUNTERATTACK:** non-phasing player counterattacks the strongest adjacent hex. No bombardment or staking the guard, just resolve the attack. Ignore terrain unless it negates the counterattack requirement. The battle types chosen at the beginning of the round remain in effect.

12. **ROUND 2:** assuming no retreat/pursuit, the battle will continue with an entirely new attack by the phasing player, beginning with the “Battle Type” step and progressing from there.

**ATRITION:** Modify the attrition roll for forces moving by forced march by a modifier equal to the MP’s spent.

**LIMITS ON CHOOSING PITCHED:**
1. Players must choose Pursuit when attacking over a primary river.
2. Players must choose Pursuit after revealing Pitched twice in one battle.
3. Initiative 1 or 2 leaders must choose Pursuit after revealing Pitched once in one battle.
4. Towns and Cities negate penalty 3 for the defender.

**STAKING THE GUARD:**
Modify the attack roll by -1. If the guard loses after being staked, Paris Morale drops by 1.

**Pursuit Override:** If the Defender wins, he may reveal a Pursuit Card and declare a Pursuit Override. He takes his losses as a retreat, and the phasing player may attempt to pursue.

**CRITICAL BATTLE:** If the losing player loses 3 or more SP’s, roll 1 dice and add the winner’s losses to the result. If the result is equal to or less than the losses suffered by the loser, the victor wins a Critical Battle, and affects Paris Morale.

---

Communications Table

Campaigns of Napoleon (2x)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line of Communications</th>
<th>Dispatch Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Must follow Primary or Secondary Roads (cannot include pontoon bridges)</td>
<td>Forces &amp; Vedettes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot be traced through combat units. Provides income of AP’s. Greater distance between source and CoO reduces the number of AP’s</td>
<td>Measured in Movement Points at Cavalry rate. Cannot be traced through ZOC’s (including vedettes).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACTIVE Supply Source**

Activates Center of Operations and Depots.

Activates Depots.

**INACTIVE Supply Source**

Reduces Attrition, and allows vedettes to remain in play during Admin phase.*

Reduces Movement Commands, Administrative Marches, and Replacements.

**21 Movement Points**

**12 Movement Points**

*Freikorps and Cossacks may operate beyond.
Napoleon at the Crossroads: Special Rules Summary

[116] Marshal Ney*
If he rolls a 6 for initiative, roll again:

1 6
2 5
3 4

Move 4 MP in that direction, as if a retreat after combat.

*[155] Austrian Statecraft: Ney rule also applies to any force in the Army of Bohemia and Army of the North.

[153] Napoleon Sighted
1-2: French pay 1 AP or reveal force leader in hex.
3: French player may lie or be honest about Napoleon's presence.
4-6: No news of the Emperor

[118] Personality Clashes

France:
- Oudinot
- Vandamme
- St. Cyr
- Murat
- Macdonald
- Ney

Coalition:
- Konstantine Wittgenstein

When one of these leaders is subordinate to another, each leader's Subordination Rating becomes 4.

[150-152] Fall of Berlin
1. Prussian Infantry Replacements: lost while Berlin occupied by the French.
2. French Infantry Replacements: add 1 per turn while Berlin is occupied by the French (to a maximum of 4).

[100] Berlin Supply Source
After 22nd September, while Berlin is Coalition controlled, the Army of Silesia may change its Active Supply Source to Berlin.

[107] Dresden
Dresden may be a French supply source if the Elbe is “open” all the way to the western map edge. If the towpath is cut by the coalition (3+ SP required to cut it) Dresden becomes a depleted depot. Towpath hexes still count as primary roads for LOC purposes, and they don’t count against the 21 hex maximum when combined with overland roads.

[73-87] Vedettes
Movement: Move automatically. Cannot cut LOC, damage bridges, etc... Removed during Admin phase if out of Dispatch Distance.
Recon: Vedettes may repulse to reveal hidden force leaders. Vedettes may elect not to retreat before combat to gain info on force strength.

Creation: may be placed on the map when a force is created or enters the map. French 1, Coalition 1-2.
Elimination: Placed with Force Leader within 7 MP’s, returned to pool if impossible.
Cossacks: vedettes with red symbols are not removed when out of dispatch distance.
Freikorps: can cut LOC. Are not removed when out of dispatch distance. Elimination removes them from play.
Despite the relative simplicity of TLNB rules, the online boards and forums generate a lot of rules questions. Many a rule has been overlooked, in areas where one rule intersects with another. It’s all about how the separate rules effect each other. As usual a little common sense helps a lot! I have bracketed rules numbers next to the text so that you can reference them.

—Vince Hughes

LEADERS & COMMAND
(Rule Sections 5 & 6)
In TLNB, where ‘Leader’ is mentioned it refers to all three classes of leader counters that are within the game (5.0). Those being in ascending order, Commanders (in overall command), Commander-Officers (Corps officers often put in charge of small army) and Officers (in charge of formations). All three provide variations of the following four functions:
• Placing Combat Units In-Command
• Reorganising eliminated units.
• Facilitating Advance After Combat for additional units.
• Facilitating stacking.

In-Command: To obtain the best performance from your units, they need to be In-Command. The procedure for placing units In-Command is a pretty simple one (6.1) and it has been around since the original ‘Napoleon’s Last Battles’ from the 70’s with minor tweaks. It was one of the first games to introduce a command system that hindered the omnipotent player moving all and sundry of his troops in perfect response to enemy movements or magically to his own current desires, for there are limits of time and space on the Napoleonic commander. For each Command Point the commander has (displayed as a numerical value on the Commander counter), he is able to put In-Command any Officer that is within 4 hexes of himself PLUS a unit or Divisional stack per command point (5.21). Having received this command point, Officers in turn are then able to place In-Command any amount of units of their formation (same coloured bar on counter) within 3 hexes of themselves. In general, there is not much to block these command ranges except (6.4) if the route passes into an unoccupied EZOC, an enemy occupied hex or across an unbridged and unfrozen river or lake hexside (note – streams do not block this).

On the map, the ideal situation then is to have one’s Commander pretty much central to his formation Officers that are involved in the hottest and most important action, ensuring that each Officer is no more than 4 hexes away from the Commander and in turn, they no further than 3 hexes from their troops. With his command point also allowing individual counters or Divisional stacks, there is room for some independent units to be close by to the Commander as well. As easy to say or write this as it is, these simple ideas can easily be upset by Combat results. This may be caused by your own units being forced to retreat. Retreats have to be conducted in certain directions and those do not always conform to your Leader layout. Advances after combat can also disrupt the command flow. That Officer that needs to advance with his troops in order to take more units into the vacated hex (see below) than the normal allowance may just be moving out of command range. If so, will it hinder your actions in the next turn? Therefore, Command range is something to try and maintain an awareness of. In the heat of battle, or should I say the full flow of the game? It can quite easily be forgotten about and only come to be realised when next working through the Command Phase and only then learning of your own earlier error!
An army on the move: the perfect scenario

As can be seen above, Napoleon (black circle) with his [3] rating places Macdonald, Nansouty & Mortier all In-Command as they lie within 4 hexes of the emperor. They in turn are within 3 hexes of their formation units and place them all In-Command. As Napoleon is also allowed to put 3 units or divisional stacks In-Command, he then places the two single green units to his right In-Command. He is also allowed to put In-Command both units of the 2 counter red formation stack north-east of him because those counters are stacked together and are from the same division (Divisional integrity 3.22). Exelmanns (circled yellow) cannot be placed In-Command because he is further than 4 hexes from Napoleon. However, with a rating of (4), the chances are high that he will be able to pass his own Initiative check and therefore be In-Command (6.3).

However, there is a mechanic to bring those Officers that are out of Command range from the Commander back into In-Command status via their own Initiative, using their own bracketed Initiative rating (6.3). This means that some Officers can be given the chance of being left out of Command range due to their individual rating for example a (4) rating. As Officers not placed In-Command can choose to roll for Initiative themselves (6.31), it gives these higher rated Officers an opportunity to act more independently than others less gifted. Another example; because a d6 is required to be rolled to achieve a score equal to or less than the Officer’s initiative rating, an Officer rated (2) is going to find it twice as difficult to place himself In-Command than one rated (4). This should focus the player’s mind on which formations need to be most cossetted by the Commanders Command rating. Be aware though that an Officer rolling for his own Initiative does not roll risk-free. A failure to get In-Command (rolling higher than the Initiative rating) means that he is not allowed to move this turn nor may any units of his formation that are within 3 hexes of him. Those units outside that range may still roll for Initiative (6.32).

The player that can get the most units In-Command regularly throughout the game will find that his battle runs far smoother than it otherwise might. The player should maximise the amount of Combat Units that are In-Command in as many ways as he can. Among the many ways to increase one’s In-Command units:

Using any pre-game March Order allocation to give March Orders to formations that might otherwise be hard to keep In-Command because of their location or Officer quality. When writing a March Order and deciding on that town or bridge (20.21) (not trestle or farm mind you) that you want the formation to reach, look as far as you possibly can. The further you can send them without requiring Command, the better. Yes, the units might be forced out of the March Order if they become adjacent to an enemy force whilst using the necessary shortest route (20.22). But try to mitigate that with some foresight and attempt to estimate where that might happen and thus ensure they will be in a position to
either look after themselves or be close enough for some friendly support.

Reinforcements also get to enter under a March Order (19.1). Think the same for them as per those March Orders at game start. Get them marching to where it matters and project beyond if need be. Do not be content to get them on the map and advance up towards the Commander. If these troops have March Orders to go further onwards even when they reach the Commander, it will mean he has a Command point he can use elsewhere for another formation.

**Leader Movement:** is something worth looking at here and not always realised by newer players. **Only** Commanders and Commander-Officers may move as and when they please around the map. Officers cannot. Without being placed In-Command by a Commander or without passing an Initiative check as above, they must remain rooted to their current location. The player cannot choose to roll an Initiative check for the leader solely for his own movement nor indeed is the player just simply allowed to move an Officer independent of any earlier In-Command rolls. Any of his formation troops within 3 hexes of him when he takes that Initiative check will also be affected in the same way. Sometimes this leads to a difficult choice. An Officer with a (2) rating say, may be too risky to roll for Initiative as a failure would freeze his troops that are in the 3 hex command range. Sometimes, it might be better to roll Initiative for those troops individually or as divisional stacks (albeit they are still under the effects of being Out of Command (6.32) meaning that although they can move, they cannot for example Advance after Combat).

**Leaders in Combat:** So what are some other uses and advantages of Leaders? The first and perhaps most obvious is Stacking. A Leader is allowed to stack with what could be a potentially devastating stack of **5** (3.23). This is an increase from the standard **2** units per hex (or **3** units if they share divisional integrity). This leader-led 5 counter stack may consist of only **2** infantry units, but may be increased to **3** infantry units if all from the same division (remember the ‘division’ is the number or abbreviation down the left hand side of the counter placed under the corps number; it is not the coloured bar along the top). As powerful as a 5 counter stack may be, it can be made even more powerful. With the number of units allowed, it leaves room for it to consist of all three arms, artillery, cavalry and infantry and therefore, if it does consist of all three arms it will earn itself a Combined Arms combat bonus of one column shift to the right, terrain permitting (11.2).

Another trait of leaders is their ability to enhance **Advance After Combat** (whether in offence or defence 12.4) following a combat where the opposition has vacated the hex. Without a Leader with the stack, any advance after combat can be carried out by just one infantry unit counter and any or all cavalry units (12.4A). No artillery may advance. When a Leader is with the stack, to represent his commanding presence, all infantry stacked with him may advance (12.4B). Be aware, that should the Leader enable more units to advance than normally allowed, he too would also have to advance into the hex to ensure Stacking limits are not violated (12.4H). Regardless of his presence, he does not affect the ability of Demoralised or Out of Supply units to advance. They would still NOT be able to do so.

**Leader Loss:** So with the ability to increase stack size and also lead more units into hexes that are to be advanced into, it might seem almost par for the course to have your Leaders boldly ‘leading’ at the front of their formations. This is where caution should be exercised and the careful choosing of where and when they do be decided. This is because if a stack they are with suffers a retreat result from any combat including bombardments, a Leader loss check must be taken (5.42). There is a 1/6 chance that the Leader will be lost. If that happens, there is a two hour (2 turn) game window before he is replaced with a Leader of lesser ability (5.52). Perhaps in a one-off game, especially in the closing turns, this might not be catastrophic. In Campaign games where there are several more battles to follow, let alone many turns in the current game, the player will soon begin to feel the results of that loss. A lower rated Commander will activate less formations and units thus reducing the whole effectiveness of his army. A lower rated Officer will struggle more to place himself into In-Command with his lower rating and therefore make that formation **17%** less likely to act on its own initiative. Even if not leading from the front, the Officer location on the
map should still be thought on with his safety in mind. An officer directly behind his troops may appear to be safe from Bombardment for example as there is no LOS through or over combat units (8.41), but the player should be aware of the potential for any breakthroughs from the enemy after combat that might leave his lone Leader subsequently adjacent to the advancing enemy combat units. If that occurs, he would then be subject to a Capture roll which is also a 1/6 chance (5.51). Finally, be conscious of any enemy flanking light cavalry troops that might be in position to make a lone leader capture attempt like some Mussolini snatch commando!

Unnecessary danger...
Mortier (circled red at right) is in the front line and at risk when there is absolutely no need for him to be there! He is stacked with a single unit meaning he is enhancing nothing for the hex he occupies. The Russian leader opposite him is on a stack of 3 units from different divisions. His presence is allowing them all to stack and should he win a combat, to advance them all into the vacated hex should he choose to.

Reorganisation: One ability not yet covered and left until last is the Leader’s ability to Reorganise (22.2) lost units that have now been Recovered (22.12). This allows the Leader to bring on up to 2 reduced strength units from the Recovered box onto his hex. There are as usual restrictions and penalties (22.23). The first thing to remember is that your Reorganising Leader may not be in an EZOC. The unit must be of their own formation unless it’s a Commander Reorganising, in which case he can Reorganise any unit as long as the formation Officer is within his Command radius even if not In-Command. Officers that Reorganise (not Commanders or Commander-Officers) get marked with an Out-Of-Command marker. This is quite an impediment. It will mean units of their formation, unless put In-Command by the Commander himself, will be Out-Of-Command for the turn and will have to rely on a Unit Initiative test for any movement they might wish to take (6.32). Therefore, if Reorganisation is to be sought-after, be sure to have that formation ready to do very little that turn or use the Commander to Reorganise the units instead if he is close enough to the formation Officer.

For Reorganisation the officers in the picture are all affected differently. Mortier (red circle) is unable to Reorganise any units at all as he is in an EZOC. Exelmanns can Reorganise up to 2 units but if does so, he will be Out-of-Command for the whole turn. Napoleon (black circle) can Reorganise units from Mortier & Exelmanns formations because he is in command range of both (4 hexes). He can also Reorganise 2 units and as a Commander, he will NOT be placed Out-of-Command if he does.

Commander-Officers: The great marshals, skilled enough to command a small army, were the few Napoleonic generals able to operate independently. Commander-Officers have all the capacities of both officers and commanders. A Commander-Officer always has to spend his first command point to put his own formation in command.

Leader Summary

Commanders automatic; officers by initiative
1. Place Combat Units In-Command
2. Reorganise eliminated units.

Commanders & Officers alike:
3. Facilitate Advance After Combat for more than one unit per attack.
4. Facilitate stacking- 5 units (up to 2 inf.)
The Peace of Vienna in 1809 ceded the Croatian frontier of the Austrian Empire to France. France divided this area into six geographic areas, each required to provide two battalions.

The Croats lived in the mountains and formed good light infantry serving in the Austrian and French armies. French general Teste said: "they were always organized and always ready." The Croats were experts in skirmish-order hill fighting but had very little passion fighting for France. Some even mutinied.

Napoleon was fascinated by their fighting skills, saying to General Marmont: "I never had braver and better soldiers." And reportedly: "Croatians, there are best soldiers in the world. If I had only 100,000 Croatians, I would conquer the entire world!"

He had, unfortunately, only 1,678 of these troops at Bautzen in May of 1813. The 2e Regiment d'Infanterie Provisoires Croate was assembled in 1813 from the 1st bn. of 4e Regiment de Chasseurs Illyriens and the 2nd bn. of 3e Regiment de Chasseurs Illyriens. They were clothed in captured brown Austrian uniforms left in the magazines, including shakos and Hungarian-style ankle boots.

Initially assigned to guard the baggage trains, these troops served in the IV Corps, 12th division of General Morand, Sicard's Brigade. The regiment participated in the successful assault on the allied center during the second day of the battle of Bautzen (21 May). They lost two officers killed and 9 wounded, and 250 enlisted men. Combined with losses at Radeburg and daily attrition, the regiment was reduced to 650 men by the end of May.
TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF MALORAYOSLAVETZ 1812

After a second visit to the battlefield, October 2016. A bit earlier than the anniversary so nature looks pretty much as it could be back then.

Model in the museum: At first I thought it be an exact representation of the place back then. After another visit, I do have a few questions I might ask to the museum, if I can get a valid answer.

1 Nowadays we have a sizable plaza in front of the convent, which is shown in one of the famous paintings of the fight in front. The convent door (by then recently built “early 19th city” was the answer!) still bears the canisters from 1812. Not shown at all here. The lay of the ground especially north east of the convent is not flat, built up (and most likely was as hardly they would have made such new plots and wooden houses much later. It explains the way of the fight as there must have been no LOS from any possible Russian batteries yonder to fire there. The battle would have had a completely different shape.

2 They show the inside of the convent a bit but importantly different as from today: shorter and less built up and notoriously without that second wall behind the first.

3 Plan of the town back then

The French, well Italians, used the typical doctrine to defend a built up area, if an unprepared defence. It is especially valid here, as the area is quite huge for the numbers they had at the beginning.

Light screen of a heavy skirmishers line in garden easy houses etc. with supports in streets all in sectors trying to coordinate the thing. One or two strong points/ key elements out of sight from the outside, in the center but closer to one’s supply/ withdrawal/ reinforcements (to avoid being easily cut off—no fort Alamo). Here the convent is the near ideal place.

It has walls high enough to need ladders to scale, probably enough stuff to be pile up (furniture/ benches etc.) inside at places to offer covered firing steps (think of the best steady shots taking muskets from a dozen lads reloading down).

It has a covered acess ingress and egress route. It cannot be attacked by artillery except from real close (and even? Plaza yes, no plaza hardly) which is pretty unsound for gunners (and even less for horses!).

12
Plaza or not?

So we have a fighting for this key place as it also covers the one entrance to the place for the French side. Lose it and forget the town.

The side of the convent as seen from French troops climbing to be fed in the fight.
It is steep, long and just behind me bends left so by then it is out of sight from the top and the Russians whenever they reached this high mark of their attacks.

The same road as seen from up near the plaza edge.

The convent is in length and assuming you can force the entrance through the door you are in surrounded by stout buildings, and face numerous walls.

I discovered another key feature which explains why the Russians never could maintain themselves there when they reached it.
The Russian-medieval motte.
The road up is backed by the very steep mound of the medieval motte. On top we have a near perfect protected position with space deep enough to have several ranks reloading for maybe 60-80 muskets firing continuously (again passing reloads from ranks behind in perfectly covered position; and remember the Russian do not have effective howitzers capable of angled fire – only Shuvalovs) down the flank of the convent over the road. It can be equivalent to a line firing by platoon of say 2bn strength; on such a small area it can be a pretty impressive suppressive fire. Not necessarily devastating as they would see very little if not much wind, generating an enormous amount of smoke.

This position is nearly unassailable from the front; I had to climb using the hands from the front. Actually I could not on the day of the visit as it was slippery/muddy. Had to go behind on the path that is more winding around and less steep. No way one can assault that from front. Mind me once up there your 2-400 packet musket loaders can also hardly come down out. At least they can shoot the crap out of you, presenting a very small target. Note: no gun can go up there either; at least not in an impromptu fight as this one especially if you hope to get it out incase of need. (ok you know the story, if a goat can go, a gun can etc...)

So because of this position, the approach road is secure for the French till they can deploy one+ bn column to fight it out on top. So feed in more troops, as many as needed till you run out of batallions or the night comes, or you think it is not worth it.

Where were the 100s of Russian guns?
In designing a game scenario of this battle, one has to be very careful of designing it so it can be pretty much shape up the way it did, given the same troops etc. When you see it, you understand the terrain is the key to everything there.

The high bank of the river Luzha are steep and very cut up up by ravines and seldom flattish nor regular. So only at places, and not often in the right directions, can one place guns there. The height and the slope also means guns cannot effectively shoot down close (under 500m) to the French arriving, whereas skirmishers just down the slope can shoot your crews. Something like that lies in the memoirs of Wilson, if one can trust what he says.

So from the way the battle developped it is pretty obvious the Russians could do very little to shoot at the narrow long columns of French reinforcements coming in.

As far as I could see the grounds there was a place sufficiently bzck and flattish (hence built up today) where some batteries (3-4?) could deploy as shown on my crude sketch.
Russian batteries, on the crest yonder. This is seen from down near the road, on the receiving end.

This map was taken from the internet. No idea of the source (??). It shows only cossacks on the flanks; no big gun lines. It was an infantry fight in a semi closed wide town of gardens, plank fences and wooden houses. (stout enough for muket balls, not for close range artillery and even less for shells. All aflame at the end.

The secondary road leading to a ford at the time? (were it a bridge they would have used it, guarded it, fought for it!) unpracticable because of the high waters.

The remnants of the WW2 bridge on this ford. The modern bridge; road to Borovsk.
Note about the French approach route:
The main road at the time went to a bridge, nowadays disapeared. I might have found its position, walking along the river: soon after it looks like there is what was a crossroad one way to the motte (and it made sense in medieval times no?) one winding up on the side of the convent.

Along the river slightly down and mostly out of sight from the high bank, there is a path, wide and good enough for infantry going to the “entrance” of the motte, up from the road. This strengthened my opinion that this position was one key to holding the place. The French could feed in infantry and ammunition there sans trouble.

Note:
The pictures painted that are shown on the net and museums seem to be wrong. It would not be the first time; not every one can be a Simon Fort especially 100-200 years afterwards.

Ideas about the Napoleon Against Russia map:
In red: it should not be possible for the Russians to put batteries shooting down from there.
The convent cannot be shot at by guns.
In green; the angle where the Russians can put guns shooting down providing the French let them (and it seems some French deployed there and fought for it at the end of the battle).
Dotted the secondary infantry approach route.
Big brown dot: the motte.
At the scale of the game: irrelevant but another factor to give special abilities to this convent sector.
The Russians can only attack from the non-red hexsides.
The other crossing: forget it unless doing a what-if—and that could also be interesting.
This summer I escorted a group of history buffs to 17 battlefields and four major fortresses. It was my first trip to Spain, just as Napoleon’s Quagmire was my first foray into the battles of the Peninsula.

—Kevin Zucker

TOUR 2017 TO SPAIN
Sudden Enlightenment

Because we were travelling with the two local historians, Srs. Ontalba and Ruiz (co-authors of ‘La Balla de Ocaña’) we were allowed to ascend the tower in the center of town, from where Spanish General Areizaga watched the battle unfold on 19 November 1809. Looking down, there is a trench that wasn’t clear on our topo source maps. Rather than having several bridges, the river there flows through the trench, and underneath a man-made plaza with various pools for washing, drinking and bathing. These fountains had been the center of life and raison d’être for the town for 1,000 years. We had noted there was a fountain (Fuente) somewhere in that area. I sketched the terrain on our game map, which I try to do on every battlefield visit. The two map patches are on the next page. These can be printed out and trimmed down to size.

Top: View of the valley from the Ocaña tower.
For more photos click the link
http://www.napoleongames.com/tour-2017
Ocaña patch (top), Ontigola patch (lower left) and the original source map that kept sealed the secret of the fountain down in the trench. (The railroad is from later in the 19th century.)

Updates

20.51 General Retreat: If the first General Retreat card for a side is played then the text on the second such card is considered non-playable.

(clarification): any units that move, must move closer to the Supply Source..."

Glossary (change): Division: Three units all belonging to the same division may stack 3 to the hex (3.22).

Talavera

28.31 (add): Also, the Alberche bridge (hex 2325) is made of stone and may not be destroyed.

28.52 (change): Mode Cards at Start: French 2, Coalition 0 (see 28.56)

28.56 (delete): "(in addition to any other Mode cards)."
Making the Most of the Spanish Forces in Quagmire
Kevin Zucker and Christopher Moeller

The Spanish performance on the battlefield was partly due to a lack of leadership and a severe command imbalance vis-à-vis the French. They were trounced repeatedly, and they are hands down the worst army we’ve seen in the system so far. Are they too awful? They have the worst unit initiatives in the system, very weak combat strengths, terrible officer initiatives and minimal command. It's hard to imagine any nation having worse ratings than these. This is as low as the system can go in almost every category...

Fortunately, there have been some replays where the Spanish actually won Medellin. They can also win Aranjuez fairly handily. I assume the Coalition can win Talavera too. Ocaña is not possible for the Spanish, I am pretty sure. If the Spanish can prevail at Almonacid, then I won't be too unhappy with play balance overall.

The appropriate area to deal with Spanish inferiority is really in the Morale area and not in the Initiative or unit quality area. Morale is reflected in the fact that, because their formations are so small, they demoralize quickly.

Combined with the small size of the divisions and weak brigades, the game seems to show that the lack of any corps structure was a major handicap. It might take a French Corps all day to demoralize, but a Spanish division might easily demoralize after just a couple of turns of combat.

These things hamstring the Spanish player, yet they are based on the historical facts on the ground. I assume that the Spanish troops and their leaders were of such poor quality that they could not perform in larger packets. If there was a way to combine those brigades into larger formations, I presume they would have done it.

So it's not just the initiative ratings that make life so difficult for the Spanish player; the Spanish Army by nature is inferior in all these ways.

But, I have to ask, how could they have won? Did I overlook something?

Later in the war, the Spanish eventually learned not to engage the French at all, but only to snipe, attack stragglers and reinforcement columns, and leave the main line battles to the British and Portuguese. Besides, they did win some battles in 1808, and several more in 1809. They had a string of victories in May-June, and also prevailed at Tamames, where they had a 2:1 advantage in numbers. Ney's Corps was commanded by a substitute officer, Marchand. They also fought a defensive battle. Fighting defensively is the key for them; and if possible, keeping a fresh division in reserve, so your Spanish can make a counterattack when the front line divisions buckle.

The Spanish are brittle; if something goes wrong, it can quickly become catastrophic. They don't have the ability to recover. I have seen a few games where the French cavalry sweep around the Spanish flanks and gobble up the lot!

Keeping a division in reserve is absolutely critical... feeding it in at the right moment is key. The problem comes when that reserve has
been used... then it becomes a matter of holding on until night.

The Spanish remind me of playing the Prussians at Jena. The Prussians don’t have the ability to bluff, so the French are free to be very aggressive: repulsing, extending dangerous salients, concentrating forces with only very weak flank protection.

I like the fact that the Spanish are in there duking it out the whole time. That’s been my experience. They can fold at any moment but until that moment, they can be quite difficult to overcome. They’re exciting to play and make for some dramatic moments. I think they require an “advanced game” of sorts... you have to bring all of your skills to bear when playing them... deception, patience, opportunism, courage in the face of difficulty, an eye for terrain.

I like the idea, in some battles, that Spanish units are +1 Shock when defending. That’s an easy “fix” if you’re feeling like the Spanish are too severely punished all around.

They are fun to play, honestly. I have to shake my head when I set up and see what I’m working with, and then gain some grudging respect for them when the French start to get bloody noses. Aaron and I beat the hell out of the French in our first Medellin.

We took a page from the replay on CSW and dug in around Don Benito, a 10 VP town near the Spanish entry hex. We threatened an advance late in the afternoon of the second day, but it was clearly going nowhere with a 2 initiative officer leading the “charge.” It got one move out of town and then stalled.

We won through a combination of careful card play, officers overnighting in town (the Spanish have lots of officers), and, late on the second day, we caught Chuck with no get-out-of-jail cards in a series of lethal counterattack-surrounds, and we killed his commander.

My experiences with Medellin and Talavera have been instructive. The Spanish have a distinct disadvantage, but it doesn’t prevent them from defending pretty stoutly as long as the numbers are fairly matched. Where they suffer is on the attack. Very hard to get any coordinated attack going until they engage (where the "minimum move 1" optional rule gives them at least a limited ability to remain engaged).

I love playing the Spanish in these battles. A real puzzle. Chateau hexes, and most other defensive hexes, cause a kind of bind for the Spanish... they create those dreaded "Ar* = Shock" results, (which, with Spanish initiatives, almost always result in their retreat). The best terrain for Spanish units are those 1.5-multiplier hexes that don't trigger Shock results (streams, hilltops, bridges), and, the best, Improved Positions.

I like to get my Spanish troops to work digging ASAP. I haven't really thought through how to protect them from artillery though. The enemy of improved positions is artillery. If the French have sufficient guns (at Talavera for example), they can, with some certainty, blast the defender out of the IP and advance into the position. We saw a good amount of that in our games. Borodino really opened my eyes to what masses of artillery can do to units in IPs. Artillery is king in that battle.

The best position for the Spanish troops is on top of hills where the French can't fire from neighboring hills. Haven't really thought it through, but it's bad building them on level ground. Behind crests is bad too, because those trigger Ar* results.
What is Scale-Appropriate?

Kevin Zucker

Contrary to long-established wargame practice, it is not appropriate for a theater commander to make deployment decisions for each division in the army along the entire front. Historically that would not be possible or desirable. That's just not the role of the theater commander. However, we gamers tend to think it is natural, because that is how we've grown accustomed to playing.

Bringing that question to *Four Lost Battles*, we have seen that Ney was not even aware of the situation across the whole battlefield of Dennewitz, and made the decision to shift Oudinot's Corps at the critical moment based on the perspective of a brigade or division commander. Vandamme, at Kulm, didn't know who he was facing or what his own reinforcement schedule was. So we have added hidden movement to avoid the effects of too much "eye in the sky" and of course the cards deal with the unknowns in force structures.

Traditional wargames grant the players instant access to all the deployments of both sides and also provide instantaneous and perfect command and control of all friendly forces. It took a finely-tuned headquarters and a determination not to wade into the battle sword in hand (like Ney was wont to do) to obtain good information about the conditions on all parts of the battlefield. It took dozens of aides de camp coming and going constantly to insure the flow of information and orders back and forth to headquarters. Even with perfect "order acceptance" there still had to be a time-lag between the receipt of the latest info at headquarters and the execution of the next set of orders. In fact, the time lag would be such that any orders would be out of date by the time they arrived, and only a formed reserve or a unit not in contact could be controlled remotely. Hence, at times the Army Commander has to intervene on the spot if he wants to achieve timely control of events on the ground.

That means that the Army Commander, represented by the player, in reality had no ability to affect the deployment of his forces once they were engaged with the enemy, unless he chose to go there in person. But if he made that choice, he had to do so in the hopes that he had chosen the decisive bit of terrain. It was always common for a general to assume that the most important events were taking place in front of him. (Napoleon at Jena has to be the best example of that, since it took hours, even after the battles had died down, for Napoleon to be convinced that Davout had faced the bulk of the Prussians at Auerstadt.)

It is clear, then, that the overall commander (in whose shoes the player stands) has little or no control over what happens when one of his brigades engages an enemy brigade. All he can do is line them up and point them in the direction he would like them to go.

This fact runs counter to the fighting spirit of the grognard, but he should not take the model of the passionate, aggressive, but often ignorant Marshal Ney. He had better concern himself with intelligence, command and control. That is where to put your focus to win.
Operations  
(cont’d from page 2)

little French cavalry to provide for security of the marching columns, and the advance was constrained by that.

Napoleon is knowingly breaking a cardinal rule of strategy here, engaging without a sufficient force of cavalry. This he is forced to do, because of the Coalition crossing of the Elbe which threatens his mobilization areas in and behind Erfurt.

Now how to distill that down to a card? Actually, we have two cards: No. 22 From the Jaws of Death; and No. 24 Disengagement; already used in other games; we can give the allies a couple apiece.

"Napoleon often achieved his final concentration (step 2 above) by employing a last-minute "pounce" on his adversary. After deluding his opponent into a sense of false security by holding back most of his corps ... the Emperor "stole a march" by ordering a rapid movement under cover of darkness..."  

Chandler (p. 178) states, "Grand Tactics in the Napoleonic era comprised the science and art of handling men, horses and guns during the crucial moves when close contact had been established with the enemy (step 3 above). It was not concerned with the confused and shifting techniques of actual hand-to-hand fighting, for these belong to the realm of tactics."

TLNB explores Grand Tactics, as Chandler explained, not Tactics. That is, the core four steps (above):

3. active operations, closed-up columns move slowly to engage.
4. the battle, part I (day 7)
5. Forced March, last minute arrivals
6. the battle, part II

The game draws-in the activities of step 2 with the Force (Reinforcement) cards and takes in steps 7 and 8 with the elaborate Victory calculations, which estimate the results of the pursuit.

UPDATE

Napoleon at Leipzig

Stockhorn’s Baden Brigade (39th Division) on the 18th (change set-up): 4903S

Here’s another unit that was wrongly located. While I was looking into the Baden Hochberg unit I ran across a narrative of the other Baden units which made up the 39th division.

http://members.home.nl/uythoven/1813/1813%20Leipzig%20Baden%20contingent.htm

There is an excellent map of the topography there. The account states...

"The 36th Division deployed in front of Holzhausen (5305S), the 39th occupied Zuckelhausen (4903S). The Baden Brigade occupied the left side, the Hessians the right half of this village. Both half batteries of the Division, by the Badeners covered by two Schützen-companies of the 3rd Regiment (Stockhorn), stood in front of the village at the road leading to the old tile shed [Ziegenschune']. The remaining ten companies of the 3rd Regiment, as well as two Hessian battalions on the Hessian side, inside the gardens and houses, faced front against Meusdorf. Two companies of the 1st Baden Regiment had their positions in the village, and the 2nd battalion of this regiment behind these. The same way, further to the right, both Hessian battalions were deployed. In communication with Holzhausen, both Schützen-companies of the 1st Baden Regiment were deployed along and behind the brook and the fences [Weidengruppen'], which connected both villages. The two remaining companies of the latter regiment stood as a reserve behind this skirmisher line. Further back on the Steinberge (5101S) a 12-pdr battery was deployed, and behind this hill stood the 31st Division (5311N). The Light Cavalry Brigade 'Beurmann' was positioned behind Schönfeld, at the road to Mockau, and in the afternoon was repositioned further right."

Currently Stockhorn is shown near the "Raths Ziegelscheune" (tiledsh), up on the north map (3626N). The "old" tiledshed stood along the road from Leipzig to Liebertwolkwitz, between Zuckelhausen and Meusdorf.

Sporschil writes: "On the right of the Meusdorf Ziegelscheune on the road leading from Liebertwolkwitz out of Leipzig were the Russian and Prussian Guards." Then Sporschil adds helpfully, "This is the old Ziegelscheune which was completely destroyed. The current Ziegelscheune is located further south than the one at the time of the Battle of Leipzig."

---

1 see Chandler’s discussion on the same topic in Campaigns, pp. 152-53-54; 172-73-74.
La Résurgence de Napoléon

NAPOLEON'S Resurgence

The Spring Renaissance of the Grande Armée, May - June, 1813

WAR OF LIBERATION, Part I

KEVIN ZUCKER

La Renaissance de la Grande Armée au printemps 1813, mai-juin 1813