

1. The marches made during each period.
2. The quality of the troops
3. The quality of the admin (staffwork)
4. Historical estimates


Von Cämmerer estimates French losses at 22,000, including losses to Ney's corps alone at 15,000. Lanrezac says a total of 18,000 and 12,000 of those in III Corps. We have said 19,368, with Ney losing 12,724 in his infantry and cavalry units. Many of the other corps were not on the battlefield or suffered fewer than 1,200 men.

We predict a further loss of 2,000 men on the march from Lützen to Torgau, and then another 3586 falling by the wayside on the quicker marches from Luckau to Klix/Drehsa on the Bautzen battlefield. The Corps made a march of 88 miles in five days (avg. 18 mi/day).

The best source I have for calculating attrition is the Attrition Quotient Matrix from *Struggle of Nations* (1982). I suspect the table gives too much attrition. It does not take into consideration the temporarily detached men. I usually plug them in under the replacements.

A rule of thumb I have used on the NAL strengths for the battle of Leipzig—considering the really big armies and exhausted depopulated zone of western Saxony in the Fall—was 1% per day. A total of 200,000 men to non-combat causes in two months. If we do 1% per day here, then Ney had 28,892 men with his corps on the 20th, more than the 26,719 on the Spreadsheet.

Some of the men who dropped behind temporarily would have caught up with their unit, but not necessarily before the battle; Ney is marching directly into the fight. He probably has just



enough time to close up the road columns and form for battle. I would like to know if anyone joined on the eve of battle and of course during the 21st.

Ney's Estimated Attrition

16 - Luckau, 212 men
 17 - Kalau, 1,695 men
 18 - Spremberg, 212 men
 19 - Maukendorf, 1525 men
 20 - Klix-Drehsa, 212 men
 Tot 3,856

Scott Bowden, in *Napoleon's Grande Armée of 1813*, has estimated III Corps Attrition between Lützen and Bautzen as 5,000. Our spreadsheet has 5,856 (Attrition 2 and Attrition 3). The estimate for "Attrition 2" is 2,000 and "Attrition 3" is 3,856.

Our sources tell us that the French Army lost over 15,000 men to attrition between Lützen and Bautzen. I have worked to incorporate Bowden's information about "strategic consumption" into Feuil3. (Bowden, pp. 90-91)

Bowden cites statistics showing even the Guard suffered a lot in the first 10 days of the campaign (up to 5 May).

Bowden quotes Lauriston's letter to HQ. His Corps "consisted entirely of the old cohorts (20-26 years old), more mature men than other corps, who had 18 and 19 year olds in their ranks." We adjusted V Corps attrition accordingly. "The regiments of my corps badly need a good night's rest. They are vigorous but they do not yet have the experience to undertake a long march."

Out of 10,581 men in the Young Guard Div.,
 -1,069 were casualties at Lützen
 -2,700 were suffering from exhaustion, malnutrition or illness during the same period.

The Young Guard may be not much different from the line conscripts. The rigors of campaigning knocked out the sick and the weak in the first ten days. Those who remain in the next two weeks are a hardier group, true; but they have outrun their supplies.

Keeping the armies in active operations for four weeks at a time goes up against the limitations of Napoleon's supply system. After 10-14 days the troops are all out of supply. They have to stop at the Elbe while the wagons catch up. Upon resupply on the 11th they march again. The Main Army gets to rest and recover prior to Bautzen, but Ney's wing does not. Therefore the

III, V and VII should have the worst attrition. But we left V Corps in better shape because of their troop quality and shorter marches.

Overall, we show that the French Army suffered attrition of 17,591 men between Lützen and Bautzen. The French lost 8.5% of their initial force in 18 days, and over the whole period, 11.4%. The III Corps suffered the most, and least was XII Corps, which hadn't fought at Lützen. Ney received 400 reinforcements during the advance but no infantry or cavalry in that time. The result is that Ney's III Corps arrived on the battlefield with 26,719 men. Since no actual state exists from the 20th, we have to calculate based on the last count we do have, 5 May. Ney lost about 4,000 men going from Luckau to Bautzen. Marshal Ney's Wing of the Army, arriving at Bautzen, totaled 58,000 men instead of the 84,000 often cited. In all, the French had 168,000 on the battlefield 20% less than the authoritative figure.

Petre, on page 89, reaches the following conclusions:

"Von Cämmerer estimated the French losses at Lützen at 22,000, including 800 prisoners carried off by the allies. He puts the loss of Ney's corps alone at 15,000 men."

Marshal Ney estimated 19,655 overall losses —2,757 killed, 16,898 wounded.

Our spreadsheet also arrives at 19,368.

"Lanrezac gives the French losses as 18,000, of whom 12,000 belonged to the III corps."

Our spreadsheet above agrees that III Corps lost 12,724.

"Lanrezac states that when the French crossed the Elbe a few days later, their army was weaker by 35,000 men than when it crossed the Saale, owing to the great number of stragglers and deserters." Our spreadsheet estimates a drop of 27,227, based on a corps-by-corps evaluation of troops and marches.

